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Section 356(a)(2): A Study of Uncertainty
in Corporate Taxation
WILLIAM J. RANDS*
Section 356(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue. Code requires
the recipient of boot in a corporate reorganization to treat any
gain recognized as a dividend, if the reorganization "has the
effect of the distribution of a dividend." This article examines
the conflicting interpretations of this section and offers sug-
gested changes in the law. The article also reviews the perform-
ance of all three branches of government in developing tax law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 356(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) is a bit
of the arcanum that constitutes the federal tax treatment of corpo-
rate reorganizations. It requires the recipient of boot in a reorgani-
zation to treat any gain recognized as a dividend, if the reorganiza-
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; J.D., Tulane University
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tion "has the effect of the distribution of a dividend" to him.1 Its
proper construction has engendered conflicting opinions among the
circuit courts of appeals' and shifting stances by the United
States.' This conflict must be resolved. The Government4 and the
tax planners alike need to know what this section means. Yet, by
examining the conflict over section 356(a)(2), we can achieve more
than an understanding of the tax treatment of boot in corporate
reorganizations. We can review the performance of all three
branches of government in developing tax law; for each has con-
tributed to creating the conflict over section 356(a)(2). Thus, the
intent of this article is not only to analyze the narrow issue of what
section 356(a)(2) means, but, additionally, to evaluate the aptitude
or inaptitude, as the case may be, of Congress, the judiciary, and
the Government in the development of section 356(a)(2).
A. Section 356(a)(2)'s Role in Corporate Reorganizations
"Reorganization" is part of the lexicon of tax lawyers that re-
fers to transactions that meet the definitional requirements of sec-
tion 368(a)(1) of the Code. This subsection covers a wide range of
1. Section 356 of the Internal Revenue Code states in part:
(a) Gain on Exchanges
(1) Recognition of gain
If-
(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an
exchange but for the fact that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of prop-
erty permitted by section 354 or 355 to be received without the rec-
ognition of gain but also of other property or money,
then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not
in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other
property.
(2) Treatment as dividend
If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of the distribution
of a dividend (determined with the application of section 318(a)), then there
shall be treated as a dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain
recognized under paragraph (1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of the
undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated after Febru-
ary 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized under paragraph (1)
shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property.
I.R.C. § 356(a)(1)-(2) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
2. Compare Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973) (adopting hypotheti-
cal post-merger redemption test) with Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (rejecting Wright and adopting pre-merger distri-
bution test). For a full discussion of the various tests used by the courts in interpreting
section 356(a)(2), see infra text accompanying notes 106-40.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 203-29.
4. See infra note 203.
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transactions-corporate amalgamations, corporate divisions, recap-
italizations, and changes in identity, form, or place of incorpora-
tion.5 Although exchanges of property generally trigger recognition
of gain or loss,' section 354(a) provides for nonrecognition of gain
or loss to taxpayers who exchange their stock or securities solely
for other stock or securities as part of a transaction that qualifies
as a reorganization under section 368(a) (1).7 If the exchange of
stock or securities would qualify for nonrecognition under section
354(a), except that the shareholder also receives boot (property
other than stock or securities), then under section 356(a)(1) the
shareholder recognizes gain equal to the lesser of the gain realized
by him or the amount of boot received.8 Section 356(a)(2) deter-
mines the character of the gain recognized. If the exchange has
"the effect of the distribution of a dividend," then the gain recog-
nized is treated as a dividend to the extent of the shareholder's
ratable share of accumulated earnings and profits. The remainder
of the gain, if any, is treated as a capital gain.9
Concomitantly, in a reorganization, a party receiving nonrec-
ognition treatment substitutes his adjusted basis in the property
he gives up for the property he receives, i.e., a shareholder's ad-
justed basis in his new stock is the same as his basis in his old
stock.'0 When the party receives boot, however, section 358 of the
Code adjusts his basis."
The theoretical underpinning for not recognizing realized gain
in corporate reorganizations is that the shareholder (or transferor
of assets) continues his investment in the corporate assets; thus, he
5. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A)-(G) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983). See generally B.
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch.
14 (4th ed. 1979) (a comprehensive discussion of corporate reorganizations); D. KAHN, BASIC
CORPORATE TAXATION, §§ 10.01-.13 (3d ed. 1981) (a discussion on the nature, definition, and
significance of classifying a transaction as a reorganization).
6. I.R.C. § 1001 (1976).
7. Section 354(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code states:
(a) General rule
(1) In general
No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a cor-
poration a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corpo-
ration or in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1976).
8. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) (1976).
9. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2).
10. I.R.C. § 358 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
11. I.R.C. § 358(a)(1)(A)-(B).
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merely alters the form of his investment, not the substance. 12 The
carryover basis serves to defer taxation of an unrecognized gain or
loss until a subsequent disposition of the stock. If the shareholder
receives boot, however, he does more than continue his investment
in an altered form: he has sold part of his stock or property and
should be taxed on the gain realized to the extent of the boot re-
ceived." In some reorganizations, however, there may be a pro rata
distribution of boot without an alteration in the proportionate in-
terests of the shareholders, e.g., a recapitalization in which a 75%
shareholder and a 25% shareholder receive 75% and 25% of the
boot, respectively, and continue their respective percentages of
stock ownership after the recapitalization.14 In such a transaction,
the distribution of the boot is indistinguishable from a dividend-
type distribution and hence should be treated like a dividend to
the extent the corporation has earnings and profits.15 Section
356(a)(2)'s role is to tax these distributions of boot as dividends.
B. 356(a)(2)'s Role in Subchapter C
Section 356(a)(2) is one of several sections in subchapter C
that characterizes certain extractions from corporations as divi-
dends, even though the transactions effecting the extractions may
consist of sales or exchanges of stock and are not typical dividend-
type distributions." Similarly, section 356(a)(2) centralizes the
12. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1115 (1979); Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 648 (lst Cir. 1949); Golub, "Boot" in
Reorganizations-The Dividend Equivalency Test of Section 356(a)(2), 58 TAXES 904, 911
(1980).
13. Golub, supra note 12, at 912.
14. Cf. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON THE REVENUE BILL OF 1924 [TO
ACCOMPANY H.R. 6715], H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, 52 (1924), reprinted
in 96 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES,
LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (B. Reams Jr. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1791; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE STATEMENT OF CHANGES MADE IN THE REVENUE
ACT OF 1921 BY H.R. 6715 AND THE REASONS THEREFOR, S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6-7 (1924), reprinted in 96 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (B. Reams Jr. ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 3981. The reports contain legislative examples similar to
that in the text.
15. The same shareholders own the same corporation in the same proportions before
and after the distribution of the boot. For a discussion of what constitutes a dividend, see
infra text accompanying notes 20, 75 and 163.
16. The other sections are 302(d), 304, 306, 356(b) and 356(e). Section 302(d) treats
redemptions not meeting any of the section 302(a) tests as a section 301 distribution. I.R.C.
§ 302(d) (1976). Section 304 makes the sale of stock by a controlling shareholder to another
controlled corporation, a transaction that may be the functional equivalent of a distribution,
"run the gauntlet of § 302, with its attendant safeguards against dividend equivalency." B.
[Vol. 38:75
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conflict between two basic tenets of corporate tax law: (i) distribu-
tions to shareholders by corporations with earnings and profits are
dividends that result in ordinary income to the shareholders;" and
(ii) sale or exchange of stock results in capital gain or loss.'8 Share-
holders in corporations with earnings and profits constantly try to
extract money from the corporation in ways that avoid classifying
the extraction as a dividend. The purpose of section 356(a)(2) and
these other sections is to exclude from capital gain treatment cer-
tain transactions, which, though ostensibly sales or exchanges of
stock, nevertheless serve as a device to siphon earnings and profits
to the shareholders.'9
II. THE BAsIC TAX PROBLEMS
Although section 356(a)(2)'s intent is to prevent distributions
of earnings and profits from receiving capital gains treatment, the
section's ambiguous language has obscured its proper construction.
Reorganizations involving boot may involve both a sale or ex-
change of property and an extraction of 'earnings and profits; each
demands a different tax treatment. Section 356(a)(2)'s use of a div-
idend-effect test is often incongruous, at least in acquisitive reorga-
nizations, because exchanges involving boot rarely resemble divi-
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 4, 1 9.31; see I.R.C. § 304 (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
Section 306, the preferred stock bail-out section, treats part of the gain from the sale of
tainted section 306 stock as ordinary income and treats the amount realized on a redemp-
tion of the tainted stock as a section 301 distribution. I.R.C. § 306 (1976, Supp. V 1981 &
West Supp. 1983). Section 356(b) treats boot distributed in a section 355 transaction (a
corporate division in which the stock of a subsidiary corporation is distributed to the share-
holders) as a section 301 distribution. I.R.C. § 356(b) (1976). Section 356(e) treats any prop-
erty received in exchange for section 306 stock in a reorganization or a section 355 transac-
tion as a section 301 distribution. I.R.C. § 356(e) (1976).
Additionally, Code sections 341 and 1239 turn capital gain into ordinary income, but do
not require the presence of earnings and profits. Section 341 denies capital gain treatment
to certain distributions from and dispositions of collapsible corporations. I.R.C. § 341(a)
(1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983). Section 1239 treats gain recognized on the sale or
exchange of property between the shareholder and an 80%-owned corporation as ordinary
income. I.R.C. § 1239(a),(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
17. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c), 316(a) (1976).
18. Comment, Determining Equivalence of "Boot" Received in a Corporate Reorgani-
zation, 32 TAx LAw. 834, 835 (1979). The recognized gain on the sale of securities entitled
the trader and investor to capital gain or loss: only the dealer is treated as receiving ordi-
nary income. See liB M. FRIED, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-TAXATION OF SECURITIES TRANS-
ACTIONS, §§ 2.04[1], 18.02 (1982).
19. H.R. REP. No. 179, supra note 14, at 14-15; S. REP. No. 398, supra note 14, at 6-7;
Gerson, Boot Dividends and the Automatic Rule: Bedford Revisited, 11 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 841, 844-45 (1970); Golub, supra note 12, at 905; Shoulson, Boot Taxation: The Blunt
Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L. REV. 573, 579 (1965).
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dend-type distributions.2 0 This inherent difficulty in applying
section 356(a)(2) has led courts and commentators to propose con-
trived solutions. These solutions generally involve comparing the
reorganization using boot with another transaction having an iden-
tical economic effect: the comparisons, however, are useless be-
cause a reorganization using boot has an economic effect identical
to more than one type of transaction, and these comparable trans-
actions often have contradictory tax consequences.
A. Section 356(a)(2)'s Ambiguity and Lack of a Judicially
Ascribed Definitive Meaning
Section 356(a)(2) differs significantly from each of the other
sections in subchapter C that excludes certain sales or exchanges
of stock from capital gain treatment. Most of these other sections,
excepting sections 302(b)(1) 2 and 302(b)(4) (as defined in
302(e)),2 2 mechanically determine whether the gain recognized con-
stitutes a dividend and, if so, the amount of that dividend.2 3 Sec-
tion 356(a)(2), on the other hand, uses "the effect of the distribu-
20. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
21. I.R.C. 8 302(b)(1) (1976).
22. I.R.C. 8 302(b)(4), (e) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983). See infra note 50
for a discussion of partial liquidation as it appeared in section 346 prior to 1982.23. For example, section 302(b)(2) prescribes percentage reductions in stock ownership,
which, if met, result in exchange treatment for the redeemed shareholder. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)
(1976). For a more detailed discussion of section 302(b)(2), see infra note 71. Section
302(b)(3) provides exchange treatment for the completely redeemed shareholder. I.R.C. §
302(b)(3) (1976). In addition, section 304 is triggered when stock of one corporation is trans-
ferred to another corporation and the transferor controls both corporations; the statute uses
the percentage of stock ownership to define control. I.R.C. § 304 (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
See generally B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 91 9.30-.32; D. KAHN, supra note 5, §§
2.26, 8.21. Section 306, on the other hand, is a bit more complex. It requires a determination
of the fair market value of the different classes of stock at the time the shareholder received
the section 306 stock. I.R.C. § 306(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1976). The other key figure for section 306 is
the earnings and profits of the corporation, a figure that is routinely computed. I.R.C. §
306(c) (1)(C)(2) (1976); see I.R.C. § 312 (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983). Like
section 304, section 1239's applicability is triggered by the percentage of stock owned. I.R.C.
§ 1239 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 356(b) treats boot distributed in a section 355 trans-
action as a section 301 distribution, I.R.C. § 356(b) (1976), and section 356(e) treats any
property received in exchange for section 306 stock in a reorganization or a section 355
transaction as a section 301 distribution. I.R.C. § 356(e) (1976).
Alternatively, like section 356(a)(2), section 341 is not objective. For example, it re-
quires a finding that the shareholder intended to dispose of his stock before the corporation
realized a substantial part of the income attributable to the property it manufactured.
I.R.C. § 341(b)(1) (1976). Other parts of section 341 epitomize the incomprehensibility of
the Internal Revenue Code. For a discussion of the labyrinth created by section 341, see
Rands, Closely Held Corporations: Federal Tax Consequences of Stock Transfer Restric-
tions, 7 J. CORP. L. 449, 449 n.1 (1982).
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tion of a dividend" language, an inexact phrase that makes us
scurry to the legislative history and case law in an attempt to learn
its meaning. Sections 302(b)(1) and 302(e), respectively the re-
demption and partial liquidation sections, use similar lan-
guage-"not essentially equivalent to a dividend." Taxpayers and
the Government have waged battle over the meaning of these sec-
tions for years.24 Although the courts at last reduced the nebulous
"not essentially equivalent" phraseology to definitive tests,2 5 inter-
pretation of section 356(a)(2) has not evolved that far. Thus, the
courts have yet to agree on the meaning of section 356(a)(2)'s "ef-
fect of the distribution of a dividend" language.2
B. Dichotomous Nature of Reorganizations Using Boot
A reorganization using boot involves a sale or exchange of
property, a transaction that would ordinarily result in a capital
gain or loss. 2 7 A reorganization using boot may, in addition, have
the effect of a distribution of a dividend. This occurs when the
boot recipient's corporation has earnings and profits, and the boot
recipient continues his interest by accepting stock in the acquiring
corporation. Accordingly, reorganizations using boot suggest di-
chotomous tax consequences: both capital gain and dividend treat-
ment. This leaves to the taxpayer and the Government the difficult
task of arguing before a court whether the sale or dividend aspect
"predominate[s]."26
C. Incongruous Test of Section 356(a)(2)
The purpose of section 356(a)(2)'s test is to determine whether
boot received in a reorganization should result in ordinary income
instead of capital gain.29 The central problem with using a divi-
dend-effect test to make that determination is that dividends usu-
ally involve a single corporation, while reorganizations typically in-
volve at least two corporations. The dividend, as commonly
24. D. KAHN, supra note 5, § 2.23.
25. The Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), settled the
meaning of the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" language in section 302(b)(1). See
infra text accompanying notes 74-75 (discussion of Davis). Sections 302(b)(4) and 302(e)
codify the corporate contraction doctrine that developed in pre-1954 cases, see, e.g., Imler v.
Commissioner, 11 T.C. 836 (1948). See infra text accompanying notes 59-60, 62-63.
26. For an explanation of the current tests and an evaluation of the current cases and
tests, see infra notes 106-39 and accompanying text.
27. See M. FRIED, supra note 18, §§ 2.04[11], 18.02.
28. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 1973). See infra notes 96-105.
29. See supra note 19.
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perceived, is a distribution to shareholders by a corporation with
earnings and profits without any consequent change in the share-
holders' proportionate interest in the corporation.30 A dividend-ef-
fect test is well suited for redemptions, because the benchmark for
testing dividend equivalency is whether there has been a meaning-
ful reduction in the shareholders' proportionate interest in a single
corporation. As a particular redemption either will or will not
cause a meaningful reduction, the dividend-effect test works well
in this context.
For most reorganizations, however-especially acquisitive re-
organizations involving two corporations with previously unrelated
shareholders-the dividend-effect test does not work well.31 The
test is inadequate because acquisitive reorganizations neither re-
duce nor preserve the shareholders' proportionate interest in a sin-
gle corporation. Instead, they alter the investment of the share-
holders in both corporations. At the very least, the shareholders
will own stock-almost always in a lower proportion-in the amal-
gamated corporation, an entity different from the corporations in
which they originally invested.
For example, in Shirnberg v. United States,3 2 the boot recipi-
ent was the majority shareholder in "a successful local company
operating in several Florida counties."3 After the reorganization
he owned "a miniscule percentage [less than 1%] of the outstand-
ing stock of a huge, publicly held corporation." '34 We cannot prop-
erly measure whether the reorganization preserved or reduced the
boot recipient's proportionate interest in his corporation because
after the reorganization he did not even own stock in the same cor-
poration. Therefore, even though the boot recipient in Shimberg
30. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 303, 313 (1970); Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235
F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956).
31. A dividend-effect test may fit nonacquisitive reorganizations (e.g., E or F reorgani-
zations and even some acquisitive reorganizations (e.g., those between corporations with re-
lated shareholders). See infra text accompanying notes 117-18 (discussion of the bastardized
Wright test) and text accompanying notes 122-35 (the discussion of nondivisive reorganiza-
tions and acquisitive reorganizations between corporations with a commonality of share-
holders). Most of the cases and controversy enveloping section 356(a)(2), however, involve
acquisitive reorganizations. Consequently, this article will focus primarily on acquisitive
reorganizations.
32. 415 F. Supp. 832, 836 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
33. Id. at 836.
34. Id.; see also Sellers v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 78-5325, at 78-6197




did extract some cash from his corporation at a time when it had
earnings and profits,38 the dividend-effect test, relying as it does on
either a reduction or preservation of the shareholder's proportion-
ate interest in his corporation, offered no help in deciding whether
this boot recipient's gain should have been taxed as a dividend or
as a capital gain.
D. Similarity in Economic Effect Between a Reorganization
Using Boot and Other Transactions
Courts and commentators often compare a reorganization us-
ing boot with other transactions having an identical economic ef-
fect and posit that section 356(a)(2) should result in the same tax
consequences." Using boot, the parties to a reorganization can
achieve the same nontax consequences in the following transac-
tions: coupling the reorganization with a distribution; coupling the
reorganization with a sale of stock; or coupling the reorganization
with a redemption.
For example, suppose that X Corp..has issued sixty shares of
common stock, all of which are owned by A and which have both a
book and a fair market value of $10 per share.3 7 Y Corp. has issued
forty shares of common stock, all of which are owned by B and
which have both a book and a fair market value of $10 per share.
X Corp. and Y Corp. have agreed to consolidate into XY Corp.
with A and B each to own fifty of the 100 authorized shares of XY
Corp. common stock. Because A and B will each own 50% of the
XY Corp. stock and A has $200 more invested in X Corp. than B
has in Y Corp., the parties want to equalize the amount of money
each shareholder will invest in XY Corp. by letting A take $100
out and making B put $100 in. 8 They can achieve this goal by
using any of the following four transactions.
First, the plan of consolidation could provide that A is to be
paid $100 as part of the consolidation. A and B would each receive
35. 415 F. Supp. at 834.
36. See, e.g., Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288-89; Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 606-
07 (8th Cir. 1973); Levin, Adess & McGaffey, Boot Distributions in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions-Determination of Dividend Equivalency, 30 TAx LAW. 287, 287-88 (1977) (reorgani-
zation coupled with a post-merger redemption); Shoulson, supra note 19, at 607-08 (reor-
ganization coupled with a distribution).
37. Fair market value is not an appropriate measure of the shares' value because it is
often difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the fair market value of shares that are not
publicly traded.
38. The parties could also require B to contribute $200 while A refrains from taking out
any boot. If they did, section 356(a)(2) would not apply because of the absence of boot.
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fifty shares of XY Corp. stock. B would contribute $100 either to Y
Corp. before the consolidation or to XY Corp. after the consolida-
tion. The $100 paid to A would constitute boot.
Second, X Corp. could make a $100 distribution to A before
the consolidation. Alternately, XY Corp. could make a $100 distri-
bution to A after the consolidation. Again A and B would each
receive fifty shares of XY Corp. stock, and B would contribute
$100 either to Y Corp. before the consolidation or to XY Corp.
after the consolidation.
Third, A could sell ten X Corp. shares to B for $100 before the
consolidation. A and B would each receive fifty shares of XY Corp.
stock. Alternatively, A and B could receive sixty and forty shares
of XY Corp. stock, respectively, and then B could buy ten shares
of XY Corp. stock from A for $100 after the consolidation.
Fourth, X Corp. could redeem ten of its shares from A for
$100 before the consolidation. Again, A and B would each receive
fifty shares of XY Corp. stock, and B would contribute $100 either
to Y Corp. before the consolidation or to XY Corp. after the con-
solidation. Alternatively, XY Corp. could redeem ten of its shares
from A for $100 after the consolidation. A and B would receive
sixty and fifty shares of XY Corp. stock, respectively, and B would
contribute $100 either to Y Corp. before the consolidation or to
XY Corp. after the consolidation.
The economic consequences of all four of these transactions,
before taxation, are identical. X Corp. and Y Corp. are consoli-
dated into XY Corp. A and B each own fifty shares of XY Corp.
stock after the transaction. A receives $100, and B pays $100. For
purposes of analysis, if the payment to A is considered to be sepa-
rate and independent from the reorganization, the last three trans-
actions result in divergent tax consequences for A. The distribu-
tion results in a dividend to the extent covered by the earnings
and profits of the distributing corporation. 9 The sale results in a
capital gain or loss. 40 If the redemption precedes the reorganiza-
tion, it results in a dividend to the extent covered by the earnings
and profits of X Corp.4 If the redemption follows the reorganiza-
tion, the change in status from majority to fifty percent share-
holder should qualify as a meaningful reduction in the share-
39. I.R.C. §§ 301(c), 316 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
40. See M. FRIED, supra note 18, at §§ 2.0411], 18.02.
41. Redemptions of any shares owned by a sole stockholder always result in dividend
treatment; the redemption cannot reduce the stockholder's proportionate interest in the cor-
poration. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).
[Vol. 38:75
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holder's proportionate interest in the corporation, and thus result
in a capital gain or loss.4
The focus on the identity in economic effect between reorgani-
zations using boot and one of these other three transactions is
scarcely a persuasive ground for adopting any particular approach
to section 356(a)(2). A reorganization using boot resembles not just
one but all three of these transactions, and each of the three can
result in contradictory tax consequences.
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE
A. The Statutory Language
Section 356(a)(2) is an example of a: prototypical subchapter C
section-unnecessarily vague and cryptic. Some writers suggest
that Congress in 1924 misapprehensively drafted this section's lim-
itation on recognized gain to the extent of boot or realized gain,
whichever is less."" Writers also have characterized the 1954 reen-
actment of section 356(a)(2) as hasty and without proper consider-
ation of past difficulties, therefore failing to resolve the section's
ambiguities." In addition, the confusion and uncertainty in apply-
ing the dividend-effect language of section 356(a)(2) has been the
subject of continuous litigation and controversy.
48
Section 356(a)(2) suffers from syntatical as well as semantical
errors. Much of the ambiguity in the dividend-effect language of
section 356(a)(2) results from violations of the drafting rule of par-
allelism. According to this rule, when the draftsman uses the same
42. I.R.C. § 302(b) (1976); see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-401, 1978-2 C.B. 127 (although re-
demption substantially reduced a stockholder's right to participate in current earnings, ac-
cumulated surplus, and right to share in net assets in liquidation (from 90 to 60 percent), it
did not constitute a meaningful reduction in the interest in the corporation because the
voting rights were not reduced to 50 percent or less); see also infra note 118.
43. Samansky, Taxation of Nonqualifying Property Distributed in Reorganizations, 31
CASE W. Ras. 1, 11 (1980); Shoulson, supra note 19, at 578-79. A shareholder receiving boot
has dividend income only if, and to the extent that, he has realized a gain on the exchange.
I.R.C. § 356(a)(2). See B. BI'rKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 5, $ 14.34; D. KAHN, supra note
5, at § 10.51.
44. Samansky, supra note 43, at 11, 33; Note, Boot Hill-Characterizing Property Dis-
tributed with Corporate Reorganizations, 4 J. CORP. L. 711, 722 (1979).
45. Golub, supra note 12, at 905. Commentators have noted the confusion surrounding
the dividend-effect language. Ayers & Repetti, Boot Distributions Under the '54 Tax Code,
32 NOTRE. DAME LAW. 414, 422 (1957); Hurley, Capital Gain Possibilities for Boot in Acquis-
itive Reorgs Lessened by Shimberg Case, 50 J. TAX'N 334, 334 (1979) (the "courts have
tumbled into confusion and uncertainty"); Note, Reorganization and Capital Gains-A
Forgotten Concept?, 41 U. Pirr. L. REV. 291, 296 (1980) (describes the language as
"metaphysical").
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language in two different places, the reader assumes that the writer
intended the same meaning. When the draftsman uses clearly dif-
ferent language, the reader assumes that the draftsman intended
different meanings. When the draftsman merely uses similar lan-
guage in two places, the reader must speculate whether or not the
slight change in language reflects an intentional change in mean-
ing.46 The reader may or may not think the draftsman intended
parallel meanings, but the differing language will leave him with a
residue of doubt.
For example, sections 356(a)(2), 302(b)(1), and 302(b)(4) (as
defined in section 302(e))' 7 resemble one another in purpose, and
use similar language. Each section provides a statutory test for
characterizing gain recognized on certain exchanges of stock either
as a capital gain or a dividend-section 356(a)(2) for reorganiza-
tions involving boot,'8 section 302(b)(1) for redemptions,49 and sec-
tion 302(b)(4) for redemptions occurring pursuant to partial liqui-
dations. The language of the tests in sections 302(b)(1) and
302(b)(4) states that gain is not a dividend, if it is "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend.""0 This language differs from section
356(a)(2)'s "effect of the aiistribution of a dividend." Because of a
similarity of language and purpose, however, some writers 1 and
46. R. DICKERSON, MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING 168-71 (1981); W. STRUNK & E.B.
WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 26-27 (3d ed. 1979); R. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAW-
YERS 57-59 (1979).
47. Section 302(b)(4) provides- that redemptions in partial liquidations are treated as
exchanges to the shareholder. I.R.C. § 302(b)(4) (West Supp. 1983). Section 302(e) defines
partial liquidations by using the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" language. I.R.C. §
302(e) (West Supp. 1983); see infra note 50.
48. See supra note 1 and text accompanying note 9.
49. Section 302(a)(1) states that the redemption shall be treated as an exchange to the
shareholder if it meets any of the tests of section 302(b). I.R.C. §§ 302(a), (b) (1976, Supp. V
1981 & West Supp. 1983). Otherwise, the redemption shall be treated as a distribution.
I.R.C. § 302(d) (1976).
50. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-
248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), altered the rules
for partial liquidations. The rules in pre-TEFRA section 346(a)(2) are now embodied in
section 302(b)(4) and are defined in section 302(e)(1)(A). In addition, there are some
changes. These changes include limiting the benefit of this provision only to noncorporate
distributees and explicitly distinguishing the application of the semantically identical "es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend" test between subsections (1) and (4) of § 302(b). This
latter change mitigates some of the confusion over the parallelism in drafting and incon-
gruity in application. Section 302(e)(1)(A) parenthetically provides that the test is deter-
mined at the corporate level rather than at the shareholder level. The explicit statutory
distinction between section 302(b)(1)'s test for redemptions and section 302(b)(4)'s test for
partial liquidations merely codified the existing law.
51. See, e.g., B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 114.34; D. KAHN, supra note 5, §
10.51; Moore, Taxation of Distributions Made in Connection with a Corporate Reorganiza-
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courts52 apply a similar analysis to construe all three provisions,
especially sections 356(a)(2) and 302(b)(1). 5 s Yet, why did Congress
use language that differs at all, if it meant to say exactly the same
thing? The use of different language implies that the sections have
somewhat different, even if only slightly different, meanings. If
Congress wanted to make the same statement in sections 302(b)(1)
and 356(a)(2), why did it not provide explicit statutory coordina-
tion between the provisions?
The problems with parallelism in subchapter C stem partly
from the patchwork approach of Congress to the Code. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service (Service) points out a loophole to Congress,
and Congress tries to patch it. Or Congre ss tries to 'ameliorate un-
expectedly harsh tax consequences occasioned by judicial or ad-
ministrative interpretation of a single Code section. The result is
an ad hoc revision of one or two sections of the Code. Many sec-
tions in subchapter C have as their antecedents ad hoc responses
by Congress to singular problems.54 These sections have histories
apart from the rest of subchapter C, and Congress has perpetuated
these peculiarities through successive reenactments of the Code.
Sections 302(b)(1), 302(b)(4), and .356(a)(2) illustrate this
patchwork process for treatment of corporate distributions. Con-
gress first used the "essentially equivalent" language in the Reve-
nue Act of 192155 as a response to Eisne v. MacOmber.s6 At that
time, all redemptions resulted in capital gain or loss. Congress
feared that corporations would issue stock dividends and then
promptly redeem the stock issued, thereby allowing the share-
holder to extract earnings and profits at capital gains rates. Con-
gress sought to thwart this scheme by providing statutory author-
tion, 17 TAx L. REv. 129, 147 (1961); Comment, Taxation of Boot Received During Acquisi-
tive Reorganization: Dividend v. Capital Gains, 13 U. RiCH. L. REv. 621, 627 n.31 (1979).
But see infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
52. See Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 1973); Hawkinson v. Com-
missioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959). But see infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
53. Most writers focus on the § 302 tests in connection with § 356(a)(2), but a few also
mention the partial liquidation rules. See, e.g., Samansky, supra note 43, at 17; Note, supra
note 44, at 743-44.
54. For example, Congress enacted section 341 to quash the tax-avoidance device of
collapsible corporations. See generally B. BrrKER & J. Eusrics, supra note 5, 12.01.
55. Revenue Act of 1921, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 227, 228-29.
56. 52 U.S. 189 (1920). This case presented the question whether, by virtue of the six-
teenth amendment, Congress has the power to tax, as income to the stockholder, a stock
dividend made in good faith against earnings and profits. The Eisner court held that receipt
of a stock dividend was not a taxable event to the stockholder.
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ity for the Government and the courts to denominate such
redemptions as dividends."7 In the 1954 Code, the then existing
case law on partial liquidations was codified in section 346(a)(2).5 1
Congress intended the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend"
language of that section to allow exchange treatment for redemp-
tions accompanied by a contraction of the corporate business.5e
Sympathetic courts had accepted the corporate contraction doc-
trine to soften the harshness of the aphorism that all pro rata re-
demptions are dividends.60 Similarly, section 356(a)(2)'s antece-
dent was the congressional response to tax avoidance devices
fraught with bail-out possibilities."
The parallelism problem also stems partly from the failure of
Congress to coordinate the language of proposed Code sections
with the language of existing Code sections. Even if the new sec-
tions are ad hoc responses to redress singular problems, Congress
nevertheless should harmonize the language of the new and old
sections. When Congress reenacted the Code in 1939 and again in
1954, it missed the opportunity to correct the ambiguities in the
language of subchapter C. For example, the use of "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend" in section 302(e) is dumbfounding. Al-
though the legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended
to codify the contraction of corporate business doctrine into pre-
sent section 302(b)(4),62 the definitional language of section 302(e)
in no way connotes this. Furthermore, Congress intended a com-
pletely different meaning for that phrase in section 302(e)(1)(A)
than it did for the identical phrase in section 302(b)(1). 5s
The inexact resemblance of the language of section 356(a)(2)
to that of sections 302(b)(1) and 302(e) has caused a disagreement
57. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 9.02.
58. See id. V 9.52; D. KAHN, supra note 5, § 2.32.
59. See supra note 58.
60. Cf. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 9.52(1); W. HOFFMAN, WEST'S FEDERAL
TAXATION: CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES, AND TRUSTS 161 (1981).
61. A typical pre-section 356(a)(2) tax avoidance device was a merger of a corporation
with high earnings and profits into a newly created corporate shell owned by the same
shareholders in the same proportion.
62. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 262, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4680, 4899-900. See generally B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note
5, 1 9.52.
63. Section 302(e)(2)(A) defines the test for section 302(b)(4). For a discussion of
302(b)(4), see supra note 50. For a discussion of section 302(b)(1), see infra note 73 and the
text accompanying notes 69-75. Curiously, sections 302(b)(1) and 302(b)(4), though relying
on identical language, make us take differing vantage points to review the transactions. Sec-
tion 301(b)(1) looks at what happens to the shareholder. Section 302(b)(4) looks at what
happens to the corporation. See D. KAHN, supra note 5, § 2.23.
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among courts64 and writers 5 as to when, and even whether, the
tests developed for sections 302(b)(1) and 302(b)(4) apply to a sec-
tion 356(a)(2) transaction. This interpretative problem may have
even confused the Government, which has taken several different
positions."
Section 356(a)(2) exemplifies the drafting technique of "con-
scious generality. 6 7 The draftsman knows that the conduct to be
regulated consists of so many variants and permutations that de-
tail in description is not merely cumbersome but impossible. More-
over, an attempt to detail every covered situation runs the risk of
fitting within the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius."s
Instead of detail, the draftsman uses general terminology that, he
hopes, is not too indefinite to regulate the proscribed conduct, but
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate administrative and judicial
treatment of the unforeseen permutations and variants. Conscious
generality, however, often provides too little guidance for the ad-
ministrators and for the persons whose conduct will be regulated.
In tax law, this causes the Service to take a stance and some mem-
bers of the bar to take a counterstance, forcing the courts to flesh
out the meaning of the statutory language in common law fashion.
These courtroom confrontations may result in stimulating frays for
both government and private counsel, and provide for intellectual
debate among academics, but they place the taxpayer in the dolor-
ous position of having to litigate how much tax he must pay. After
years of confrontations, the courts often forge the general termi-
nology into a term of art with a relatively definitive meaning. In
most cases, this clarification occurs too late for the beleaguered
taxpayers who are the subjects of the courtroom battles.
64. Compare Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 1973) with Shimberg
577 F.2d at 287.
65. Compare Gerson, supra note 19, at 865 and Levin, Adess & McGaffey, supra note
36, at 307 with Golub, supra note 12, at 912 and Samansky, supra note 43, at 48.
66. At various times the Government has espoused the automatic dividend rule, the
applicability of the principles of section 302(b), a pre-merger redemption test, and a pre-
merger distribution test. See infra text accompanying notes 208-09, 222-26, and 228-29.
Sometimes the Government has tried to avoid the reapplicability of section 356(a)(2) alto-
gether by characterizing the distribution of boot as being a transaction completely apart
from the reorganization. See, e.g., King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 512,
518 (Ct. Cl. 1969). For a discussion of the various stances taken by the IRS, see infra text
accompanying notes 206-33.
67. Professor Irving Rutter used the term "conscious generality" in his seminal work on
teaching legal drafting in law schools. See Rutter, A Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operations,
13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301, 346 (1961).
68. "[Tlhe expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
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Section 302(b)(1), a close cousin of section 356(a)(2), is a
prime example of the problem of conscious generality. Section
302(b)(1)'s "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" served as the
sole statutory guidance in deciding tax treatment of redemptions
for more than thirty years preceding the 1954 Code." This para-
graph has spawned a group of more definitive tests that courts
have used to decide redemption cases on more than an ad hoc ba-
sis. Different courts have considered so many disparate factors in
deciding the redemption cases that these tests have been referred
to as the "witch's brew. '7 0 Although in the 1954 Code Congress
discarded conscious generality in part by enacting the safe harbors
of sections 302(b)(2) and (3)71 and 346(b), '72 it nevertheless was un-
able to break with the past completely and retained the ambiguous
"not essentially equivalent to a dividend" language.73 Finally, in
1970, the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis7 4 held that a
redemption is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend," if it re-
sults in a "meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate
interest in the corporation. 7 5 Thus, the Court created a uniformly
accepted meaning for this phrase.
The status of section 356(a)(2) is similar to that of section
302(b)(1) prior to the Davis decision: the circuit courts of appeals
69. B. BrrrKER & J. EUsincE, supra note 5, 9.01.
70. Id. 9.02.
71. Section 302(b)(2) allows exchange treatment for "substantially disproportionate"
redemptions. To qualify, the shareholder must own less than 50% of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote immediately after the redemption; the
ratio of voting stock he owns immediately after the redemption must be less than 80% of
the ratio of voting stock that he owned immediately before the redemption; and the ratio of
common stock he owns immediately after the redemption must be less than 80% of the
common stock he owned immediately before the redemption. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1976). Sec-
tion 302(b)(3) allows exchange treatment for a redemption of all of the shareholder's stock.
I.R.C. § 302(b)(3) (1976).
72. Section 331(a) and 346(b) provided for exchange treatment to the shareholder for a
redemption accompanied by the termination of an active trade or business by a corporation
engaged in two or more active trades or businesses. I.R.C. §§ 332(a), 346(b) (1976). As
amended by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended in §§ 331(a)
and 302(b)(4) (West Supp. 1983)), section 332(a) and section 302(b)(4), which embodies pre-
TEFRA section 346(a), still provide exchange treatment for certain corporate distributions.
73. Congress retained the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" language in section
302(b)(1) to allow capital gain treatment for redemptions of a part of a preferred share-
holder's stock. Section 302(b)(2) does not apply to such redemptions because it is limited to
voting stock. See B. BiTrKnn & J. EusicE, supra note 5, 1 9.24. Section 302(b)(1), however,
is not limited to preferred or nonvoting stock. Taxpayers use it as a last resort after failing
to meet the mechanical standards of sections 302(b)(2) and (3).
74. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
75. Id. at 313.
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are in conflict,76 and the academic commentators disagree on a res-
olution. 77 Although the offending phrase-essentially equivalent to
a dividend-has been part of the tax law for nearly sixty yearss7 8
the courts have yet to decipher its full meaning.
7e
B. Legislative History
In 1945, in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford,80 Justice
Frankfurter sought interpretative guidance from the legislative his-
tory of section 356(a)(2)'s predecessor8" to try to resolve the ambi-
guity of the statutory language. The Justice ruefully concluded
that "[t]he history of this legislation is not illuminating. '82 The
legislative history of section 356(a)(2), though now more extensive,
remains ambiguous, a fact that is readily apparent when one re-
views the varying interpretations it has engendered. 3
The legislative history of section 356(a)(2) does shed light on
the problems Congress encounters in formulating corporate tax
laws. Prior to 1924, gains recognized on account of boot were taxed
at capital gains rates. This statutory regime left the way open for
the distribution of dividends under the guise of boot when the dis-
tribution was coupled with reorganization. ' To explain the prob-
76. Compare Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 600 (8th Cir. 1973) with Shimberg,
577 F.2d at 283.
77. Compare Samansky, supra note 43, at 48, with Golub, supra note 12, at 911, 913
and Hurley, supra note 45, at 338.
78. Section 356(a)(2) embodies section 203(d) of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §
203(d), 43 Stat. 253, 257. Samansky, supra note 43, at 9-10 & n.38.
79. There remain numerous interpretations of section 356(a)(2)'s "effect of the distribu-
tion of a dividend" language. For a discussion of the current interpretations, see infra text
accompanying notes 96-140.
80. 325 U.S. 283, 290 (1945).
81. See infra note 102.
82. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. at 290.
83. For example, one writer contends that the legislative history "shows that Congress
has continually and completely rejected all notions that the receipt of other property in a
reorganization should be considered as occurring 'without the reorganization.'" Golub,
supra note 12, at 906 (footnote omitted). Another commentator, presumably as rational and
perceptive as the first, claims that the legislative history shows that Congress intended boot
to be viewed as a substitute for distribution by the transferor corporation prior to the reor-
ganization. Samansky, supra note 43, at 34-36; see also Shoulson, supra note 19, at 579, 608;
Note, supra note 44, at 720 n.78, 738; Graduate Tax Paper, Book Distributions in Corporate
Reorganizations: Dividend Equivalence and the Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 32 U. FLA.
L. REv. 119, 131 (1979). Shimberg stated that "the legislative history of § 356(a)(2)'s prede-
cessor statute makes clear that a distribution that would have been a dividend if made prior
to the reorganization is subject to the same treatment when made as part of the transac-
tion." 577 F.2d at 288.
84. Moore, supra note 51, at 131.
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lem, the committee report on the 1924 legislation offered an
illustration:
The necessity for this provision may best be shown by an
example: Corporation A has capital stock of $100,000, and earn-
ings and profits accumulated since March 1, 1913, of $50,000. If
it distributes the $50,000 as a dividend to its stockholders, the
amount distributed will be taxed at the full surtax rates.
On the other hand, corporation A may organize Corporation
B, to which it transfers all its assets, the consideration for the
transfer being the issuance by B of all its stock and $50,000 in
cash to the stockholders of corporation A in exchange for their
stock in corporation A. Under the existing law, the $50,000 dis-
tributed with the stock of corporation B would be taxed, not as
a dividend, but as capital gain. . . . The effect of such a distri-
bution is obviously the same as if the corporation had declared
out as a dividend its $50,000 earnings and profits. If dividends
are to be subject to the full surtax rates, then such an amount so
distributed should also be subject to the surtax rates ....
[T]his provision prevents evasion. 8
Accordingly, Congress sought to resolve the problem by taxing
as a dividend any distribution connected with the reorganization
that had the effect of a dividend. This language remains substan-
tially unchanged in today's statute. The patchwork legislation of
section 356(a)(2) did not fully resolve the problem of dividend
equivalency, because it taxed only the gain on the transaction as a
dividend rather than the full value of the boot to the extent cov-
ered by earnings and profits. As one writer suggests,
It should have been apparent that the problems of dividend
equivalency could not be met by a statutory amendment di-
rected only toward taxing the gain on the transaction as a whole
at ordinary rather than capital gains rates. Yet this is precisely
what section 203(d)(2) of the 1924 Act [did] . . ..
85. H.R. REP. No. 179, supra note 14, at 15; see also S. REP. No. 398, supra note 14, at
7.
86. Moore, supra note 51, at 131 (emphasis added). To illustrate the gain limitation, let
us suppose that X Corp. completed a recapitalization that amounted to an E Reorganization
under section 368(a)(1)(E) of the Code. As part of the recapitalization, X Corp. distributed
boot of $500 to A, one of its shareholders. A realized a gain of $100. Before and after the
transaction X Corp. had accumulated earnings and profits of $20,000. According to sections
356(a)(1) and (2), A's recognized gain and, therefore, the amount of the dividend to him is
limited by the amount of the boot received. Thus, though he received $500 from a corpora-
tion with earnings and profits of $20,000, his recognized gain and the dividend to him never-
theless will be only $100. The other $400 he received remains unrecognized. If there had
been no reorganization and he had received a distribution of $500 from X Corp., the full
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Since boot was taxed only to the extent of gain, and provided that
it did not exceed the distributee's ratable share of accumulated
earnings and profits, some or all of the boot covered could escape
dividend treatment.87 Further, in 1924 Congress was unaware of
the obverse problem of whether the gain recognized on account of
boot should be treated as a dividend to the extent of gain merely
because of the existence of earnings and profits. This issue arose as
a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Bedford.88
The 1924 statute and its legislative history left a host of con-
flicting inferences. The committee reports show that Congress was
concerned with the siphoning off of corporate earnings at capital
gains rates.8 9 Yet the statute's dividend-within-gain limitation and
failure to refer to current earnings and profits allowed some corpo-
rate earnings to escape dividend treatment. The example in the
committee report consists of a transaction clearly designed for tax
avoidance. Yet the statute does not limit dividend treatment to tax
avoidance schemes or transactions without a bona fide business
purpose. Moreover, the example consists of a transaction involving
not an amalgamation of unrelated corporations, but a nonacquisi-
tive transaction in which it is possible to measure the reduction of
the shareholders' interest. The statute, however, does not distin-
guish between acquisitive and nonacquisitive reorganizations.
In 1954, the House proposed to remove the limitations based
on gain and ratable shares of earnings and profits and to treat the
boot as a distribution made to the shareholder prior to the reor-
ganization. The House wanted to "correlate the treatment of such
'boot' distributions to shareholders . . . with other distributions of
money or property made directly by the corporation to its share-
holders." 90 The House Committee wanted to "'eliminate the in-
consistencies existing under present law, between the operations of
Sections [301 and 3561.' ,9 The House proposed to eliminate the
dividend-effect language and to incorporate the disproportionate
$500 would have been taxable to A as a dividend under sections 301 and 316.
87. Samansky, supra note 43, at 11 n.43.
88. Moore, supra note 51, at 130.
89. S. REP. No. 398, supra note 14, at 7 ("The provisions of the reorganization section
of the present law have been rewritten to prevent the use of this section to escape proper
taxation. . . by distributing as capital gains what are in effect dividends out of earnings.").
90. Golub, supra note 12, at 906 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
A119, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4257); see also Note, supra
note 44, at 724.
91. Note, supra note 44, at 724 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A119,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4257).
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reduction test now a part of section 302(b)(2).1 The section
302(b)(2) measurement was to be applied by reference to the per-
centage of stockholdings among the former shareholders of the ac-
quired corporation only, and not among all the shareholders of the
amalgamated corporation. The Senate rejected the House propo-
sal, returning to "existing law," 4 i.e., retaining the law with respect
to boot as it had been since 1924. In 1959, Congress again reviewed
but rejected a proposed change in section 356(a)(2). This proposed
change would have caused the recipient of boot to be "'taxed as if
the distribution were made by a corporation without a reorganiza-
tion occurring.' "95
The House proposals reflect a greater understanding of the er-
rors in the original legislation and the problems with the dividend-
effect language. Unfortunately, in its haste to enact the 1954 Code,
the Senate bypassed the chance for a thorough review of the divi-
dend-effect language. It also bypassed the opportunity to eliminate
a longstanding troublespot from subchapter C.
IV. THE COURTS: CASE LAW
When reading judicial opinions on tax issues, the perspica-
92. The language of the proposed subsections was as follows:
(1) DISTRIBUTIONS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONAT--In the case of a dis-
tribution not substantially disproportionate within the meaning of section
302(a)(4) [now § 302(b)(2)] the amount of money plus the fair market value of
other property distributed shall be treated as provided in section 301 relating to
corporate distributions of property.
(2) SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE DIsTRiBUTIONS-In the case of a distribu-
tion of property which is substantially disproportionate within the meaning of
section 302(a)(4) [now § 302(b)(2)] . . . no loss shall be recognized and gain shall
be recognized only to the extent of the amount of money and the fair market
value of other property.
Note, supra note 44, at 724 n.106 (quoting H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 306 (1954)).
93. The language of the proposed subsection was as follows:
(3) SPECIAL ROLE-The determination of whether a distribution is substantially
disproportionate within the meaning of section 302(a)(4) [now § 302(b)(2)] shall
be made by reference to the shareholders of the corporation in which the share-
holder held stock immediately prior to the transaction and by reference to the
participating stock received in the transaction (or held, as the case may be) by
all of such shareholders.
Id.
94. Note, supra note 44, at 725 n.107; see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4682; Golub, supra note 12, at 906.
95. Golub, supra note 12, at 906 (footnote omitted); see STAIV OF JOINT COMM. ON IN-
TERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 85TH CONG., 2D SESs., SUMMARY OF THE SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY




cious reader often can detect the opinion writer's lack of comfort
with tax law. Sometimes statements such as "this area of the law is
especially complex" evince this uneasiness. The opinion writer may
award undue deference to commentators," or even to counsel ap-
pearing before it ("we would like to thank counsel for their excel-
lent briefs that clarified the issues of this case"). 7
One senses this lack of confidence in the 1945 Supreme Court
opinion in Estate of Bedford.8 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
Court, was "thrown back" to the language of the statute when he
was unable to gain interpretative help from the legislative his-
tory.9 Immediately following a declaration of the Court's holding,
Justice Frankfurter expressed this thought:
As is true of other teasing questions of construction raised by
technical provisions of Revenue Acts the matter is not wholly
free from doubt. But these doubts would have to be stronger
than they are to displace the informed views of the Tax Court.
And if the case can be reduced to its own particular circum-
stances rather than turn on a generalizing principle we should
feel bound to apply Dobson v. Commissioner ... and sustain
the Tax Court.100
Such nonassertive writing hardly instills confidence in the ability
of courts to formulate tax law. Yet, despite Justice Frankfurter's
reluctance to promulgate a "generalizing principle," Estate of Bed-
ford served for many years as authority for the Service's adherence
to the automatic dividend rule.10 1 According to this rule, if the dis-
tributing corporation has earnings and profits, the gain recognized
96. The Fifth Circuit in General Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056,
1061 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980), conceded indebtedness to several writers for their "perceptive and
comprehensive analysis of the issues before us" and for an "excellent critique of the FEC
decision."
97. In Shimberg, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[tlhis case is obviously a complex one,
and the court was aided by the excellent briefs and argument of both parties." 577 F.2d at
290-91 n.20.
98. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
99. Id. at 290.
100. Id. at 292 (citation omitted).
101. The Government advocated the applicability of the automatic dividend rule in nu-
merous cases. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 604 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973); Bab-
cock v. Phillips, 372 F.2d 240, 243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 918 (1967); Commis-
sioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676, 677-78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961);
Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 750 (2d Cir. 1956); Estate of Hill v. Commis-
sioner, 10 T.C. 1090, 1096 (1948). Revenue Ruling 56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191, espousing the
IRS's adherence to the rule, remained the official stance until 1974. See infra note 105 and
accompanying text.
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on account of boot is "automatically" a dividend."'2 Criticized by
commentators'0 3 and ultimately rejected by the courts,10 4 the rule
was formally abandoned by the Service in 1974.105 Now in its place
are the four rules discussed below, three of them clearly in conflict.
A. The Current Tests
1. HYPOTHETICAL POST-MERGER REDEMPTION (THE Wright TEST)
In Wright v. United States,0 1 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit used a hypothetical post-merger re-
demption to decide the character of gain according to section
356(a)(2)."'0 The Wright test begins with the supposition that the
102. The Supreme Court in Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. at 292, held "that a distribu-
tion, pursuant to a reorganization, of earnings and profits 'has the effect of a distribution of
a taxable dividend' within § 112(c)(2)" (antecedent of I.R.C. § 356(a)(2)).
103. The following are a few of the many remarks directed at Bedford and the auto-
matic dividend rule. The automatic dividend is "now infamous" and "subject to extensive
criticism." Graduate Tax Paper, supra note 83, at 152 (footnote omitted). It is a "Blunt
Toe," and Bedford is a "CANNON USED TO KILL A MousE." Shoulson, supra note 19, at 573.
The "obfuscatory opinion" in Bedford "led to unresolved controversy." Comment, supra
note 51, at 625 (citations omitted). Bedford led to "harsh results" and may be headed for its
overdue demise. Gerson, supra note 19, at 841, 850. Ever since Bedford "a great deal of
confusion has existed as to the proper treatment" of boot. Kennedy, Boot Received in Ac-
quisitive Reorganizations: What is the Prospect for Capital Gains?, 41 J. TAX'N 288 (1974).
The automatic dividend rule resulted from "loose language in the Supreme Court's Bedford
opinion." Levin, Adess & McGaffey, supra note 36, at 287.
The underlying error in the automatic dividend rule is that the dividend-effect language
of section 356(a)(2) and its predecessors obviously requires some analysis other than a mere
reference to the earnings and profits. If Congress had wanted an automatic dividend rule, it
easily could have provided that boot was to be governed by section 301, thereby pretermit-
ting the dividend-effect analysis required by section 356(a)(2). Section 356(b), for example,
mandates that boot received in a section 355 transaction must be treated as a section 301
distribution. I.R.C. § 356(b) (1976).
104. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972),
aff'd, 482 F.2d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 1973); Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807,
809 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958). See generally Samansky, supra note 43, at
16 & n.64.
105. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118, 120 (the IRS made it clear that Revenue Ruling
56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191, which espoused the Government's adherence to the rule, did not
imply "that cash paid by an acquiring corporation always has the effect of the distribution
of a dividend within the meaning of section 356(a)(2) of the Code."); Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-
2 C.B. 121; see also B. BirrTwa & J. EusTicE, supra note 5, 14.34; D. KAHN, supra note 5, §
9.23; Graduate Tax Paper, supra note 83, at 133.
106. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
107. In Wright, the taxpayer, a majority shareholder in three corporations, and Dunn,
an employee, wanted to consolidate two of the three corporations. The taxpayer owned
71.5% of the stock of one of the corporations, Danco; Dunn owned 28.5%. The taxpayer and
his family owned virtually 100% of the stock of another of the corporations, F & G. The
taxpayer and Dunn owned, respectively, about 70% and 30% of the third corporation,
World Wide. The taxpayer and Dunn wanted to consolidate F & G and World Wide into a
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boot recipient in a reorganization has received shares in the trans-
feree corporation in place of the boot he in fact received. In other
words, the Wright test deems the boot recipient to own, after the
reorganization, shares constructively received in place of the boot,
in addition to the shares actually owned by him. The Wright test
then hypothesizes that the transferee corporation redeemed the
shares constructively owned in place of the boot and paid for these
shares by conveying the boot to the boot recipient. If the redemp-
tion of the constructive shares satisfies any of the tests of section
302(b), the boot recipient treats the gain recognized on account of
boot as a capital gain. Otherwise he must treat the gain as a
dividend. 08
To illustrate further,109 suppose that X Corp. has sixty issued
and outstanding shares of common stock, all of which are owned
by A. Y Corp. has forty issued and outstanding shares of common
stock, none of which are owned by A. X Corp. merges into Y Corp.,
and the merger qualifies as an A reorganization. As part of the
merger, Y Corp. issues thirty-five newly authorized shares of com-
mon stock to A. Additionally, Y Corp. pays $250 to A. Assume that
the Y Corp. stock has a fair market value per share of $10. Using
the Wright test, if A had received Y Corp. common shares instead
of the $250 boot he in fact received, A would have received an ad-
new corporation, Omni, in which the taxpayer and Dunn would own the same percentages of
stock as they owned in Danco.
A simple consolidation of F & G and World Wide into Omni would have resulted in an
85% stockholding for the taxpayer, however, instead of the 70% agreed upon by the tax-
payer and Dunn. In return for a reduction of the taxpayer's percentage of stock in Omni
from 85% to 70% (approximately 8% of the 70% to be owned by the taxpayer's relatives),
Omni distributed boot to the taxpayer. Applying the hypothetical post-merger redemption
test, the Eighth Circuit held that the hypothetical post-merger redemption qualified as a
redemption under section 302(b)(1) as "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" and, hence,
did not have the "effect of the distribution of a dividend under section 356(a)(2)." The
taxpayer's reduction in his interest in Omni from 85% to 61.7% constituted a meaningful
reduction under United States v. Davis. The court declined to apply the attribution rules. If
it had applied them, the taxpayer would have owned approximately 70% after the hypo-
thetical redemption. Wright, 482 F.2d at 602-04, 608-10. See generally Fassler, Fifth Cir-
cuit's Shimberg, Jr. Decision-Automatic Dividend Treatment of Boot in Acquisitive Reor-
ganizations, 57 TAXES 159, 160 (1979); Gately & Pratt, Dividend Equivalency-Are the
Tests Changing?, 7 J. CORP. TAx'N 53, 57 (1980); Golub, supra note 12, at 909; Hurley,
supra note 45, at 335; Levin, Adess & McGaffey, supra note 36, at 289; Samansky, supra
note 43, at 27; Note, Taxation of Boot Distributions: A Return to Bedford?, 7 HoFsTRA L.
REv. 987, 994 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Return to Bedford]; Note, supra note 44, at
729; Note, supra note 45, at 302; Graduate Tax Paper, supra note 83, at 138; Casenote,
Treatment of Cash Distributions to Shareholders Pursuant to a Corporate Reorganization,
20 B.C.L. REv. 601, 608 (1979).
108. 482 F.2d at 606.
109. The facts in this example are taken from Revenue Ruling 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
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ditional twenty-five shares in Y Corp. ($250 boot received - $10 Y
Corp. fair market value per share). A would have received, actually
and constructively, sixty shares of Y Corp. stock, thereby making
him a 60 % owner (sixty of the one hundred issued and outstanding
Y Corp. shares). Y Corp. then, hypothetically redeems the twenty-
five constructively owned shares, thereby reducing A's percentage
of stock ownership from 60% to 46.6%. The reduction in interest
effected by the hypothetical redemption satisfies the substantially
disproportionate redemption requirements of section 302(b)(2).11o
Thus, according to the Wright test, A would treat the gain recog-
nized on account of boot as a capital gain rather than as a
dividend.
2. HYPOTHETICAL PRE-MERGER REDEMPTION
Revenue Ruling 75-83.. rejects the hypothetical post-merger
redemption test of Wright. Instead, the Service applies the section
302(b) tests as if the transferor corporation (the acquired corpora-
tion) distributed the boot in redemption of the boot recipient's
shares in the transferor prior to the merger. If the hypothetical
redemption satisfies one of the tests of section 302(b), then the
boot recipient's recognized gain is a capital gain. Otherwise it is a
dividend to the extent of earnings and profits. 1 2
For example, assume that X Corp. stock is worth $10 per
share. Using the set of facts discussed above, A is treated as having
received the $250 boot in exchange for 25 shares of his X Corp.
stock ($250 boot + $10 X Corp.'s fair market value per share).
The redemption does not reduce A's percentage ownership in X at
all, because A owned all the X stock both before and after the re-
demption. And because the redemption does not satisfy any of the
other section 302(b) tests, 8 the gain recognized on account of boot
110. A's 46.6% interest in Y Corp. after the redemption obviously meets the first re-
quirement of section 302(b)(2), that the redeemed shareholder own less than 50% of the
votes in the corporation after the redemption. It also meets the second requirement of sec-
tion 302(b)(2), that the redeemed shareholder own less than 80% of the ratio of voting stock
he owned immediately before the redemption. According to the facts in this example, if he
had owned exactly 80% of the voting stock immediately after the redemption, he would
have owned 48% (60% ratio before redemption x 80% = 48%). Because Y Corp. issued
only one class of voting stock, we have no need to compute the 80% tests separately for
both common and voting stock. For a discussion of section 302(b)(2)'s requirements, see
supra note 71.
111. 1975-1 C.B. 112.
112. Id.
113. See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970). In Davis, the taxpayer organ-
ized a corporation with another person, Bradley, and received 500 shares (250 each for his
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is treated as a dividend.
3. HYPOTHETICAL PRE-MERGER DISTRIBUTION (THE Shimberg TEST)
Shimberg v. United States,"" a Fifth Circuit case, used a hy-
pothetical pre-merger distribution to decide the character of gain
according to section 356(a)(2). The Shimberg test, developed by
the court, is "whether the distribution would have been taxed as a
dividend if made prior to the reorganization or if no reorganization
occurred."'1 5 According to the Shimberg test, the distribution of
boot, if pro rata, is no more than a substitute for a pre-merger
dividend-type distribution and is therefore treated as a dividend to
the extent covered by earnings and profits (qualified, of course, by
the limitations of section 356(a))."
Using the same facts used to explain the Wright test, the dis-
tribution of the $250 as boot is deemed to be a distribution from
the acquired corporation without reference to the merger. If it
would have been a dividend had the merger not taken place, it is
considered a dividend. Otherwise it entitles A to a capital gain.
4. MEASUREMENT OF PERCENTAGE OF STOCK OWNERSHIP AFTER
MERGER COMPARED TO PERCENTAGE OF STOCK OWNERSHIP BEFORE
MERGER ("BEFORE AND AFTER TEST" OR THE "BASTARDIZED Wright
TEST")
Several' district courts have altered the Wright test into a
comparison of the percentage of stock owned by the boot recipient
wife and himself). Soon after, Davis bought 1,000 more shares at $25 par value, to allow the
corporation to qualify for a loan. Pursuant to agreement, after the loan was repaid, Davis
redeemed his stock.
The Supreme Court ruled that the corporate distribution to Davis was a dividend. "If a
corporation distributes property as a simple dividend, the effect is to transfer the property
from the company to its shareholders without a change in the relative economic interests or
rights of the stockholders. Where a redemption has that same effect, it cannot be said to
have satisfied the 'not essentially equivalent to a dividend' requirement of § 302(b)(1)." Id.
114. 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'g 415 F. Supp 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979). In Shimberg, the taxpayer owned 66.8% of the stock of LSC, a closely
held Florida corporation. In 1970 LSC merged into MGIC, a publicly held holding company
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. In accordance with the plan of merger, the LSC
shareholders received, pro rata, MGIC common stock and cash in exchange for their LSC
stock. After the merger the taxpayer owned less than 1% of the shares of MGIC. The tax-
payer reported the gain recognized on account of the receipt of the cash as a capital gain.
The district court agreed, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the boot distribu-
tion must be treated as a dividend.
115. 577 F.2d at 288.
116. Id.
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in the acquiring corporation after the reorganization with the per-
centage of stock owned by the boot recipient in the acquired cor-
poration before the reorganization. 17 These opinions treat the re-
organization like a redemption within the framework of a single
corporate shell. If the percentage of stock ownership after the reor-
ganization is sufficiently less than the percentage of stock owner-
ship before the reorganization to meet the meaningful reduction
test of section 302(b)(1) or, presumably, any of the other section
302(b) tests, then the boot recipient must treat the gain recognized
as a capital gain. Otherwise the gain recognized is a dividend.
Illustrating with the now familiar hypothetical facts, A's per-
centage of stock ownership under the bastardized Wright test has
been reduced from 100% in X Corp. to 46.7% in Y Corp. (thirty-
five of the seventy-five issued and outstanding shares of Y Corp.).
The reduction in interest satisfies either the substantially dispro-
portionate redemption requirements of section 302(b)(2) or the
meaningful reduction requirements of section 302(b)(1). 118 Thus,
according to this test, A would treat gain recognized on account of
boot as capital gain rather than as a dividend under section
356(a)(2).
B. Evaluation of the Current Tests
The dividend-effect language of section 356(a)(2) is so ill-
fitting and ambiguous that it is impossible to definitively state
whether the statute mandates the use of any one of the four tests
for reorganizations involving boot. Nor is it morally mandated to
select one of these tests over the other three or even to reject all
117. See General Housewares Corp. v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 926, 943 (N.D. Ala.
1977), rev'd, 615 F.2d 1056, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980); Sellers v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-
H) 78-5325, at 78-6197 (N.D. Ala. 1977), rev'd, 615 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1980); cf
Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. at 836.
118. A's 46.7% interest in Y Corp. is less than 50% of the total combined voting power
of all classes entitled to vote immediately after redemption. His 46.7% is less than 80% of
the ratio of voting stock that A owned immediately before the redemption-he had owned
100% of the voting stock before the redemption. Again, the ratio need not be computed for
both voting and common stock because Y Corp. had issued only one class of stock. Thus, the
transaction meets all three requirements of section 302(b)(2). See I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1976).
For discussion of the requirements of section 302(b)(2), see supra note 71.
Authorities emphasize the loss of control as the key factor for finding a lack of dividend
equivalency for redemptions of majority shareholders' stock. If the redemption results in the
loss of control, then the majority shareholder has sustained a meaningful reduction in his
proportionate interest in the corporation. See, e.g., Davis, 397 U.S. 302 (1970); Rev. Rul. 78-
401, 1978-2 C.B. 127. In the example in the text, A went from a 100% shareholder to a
minority shareholder. Obviously, this reduction in interest satisfies the meaningful reduc-
tion test of section 302(b)(1).
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four. For these reasons, the jurisprudential abilities -of a court, the
Service, or a commentator who advocates any of the four tests
should not be denigrated, unless, perhaps, the advocacy is so dog-
matic as not to admit the unsure footing of the position taken. Yet,
all four of the tests suffer from infirmities.
Critics carp that the Wright test does not address the abuse
that section 356(a)(2) was enacted to prevent-the siphoning off of
corporate profits at capital gains rates1 1 -and that it vitiates the
effectiveness of section 356(a)(2). Indeed, the greater the with-
drawal of corporate profits (i.e., the larger the boot), the more
likely the boot recipient will receive exchange treatment. There
will be a greater number of constructive shares to redeem and,
hence, the hypothetical post-merger redemption will cause a
greater reduction in the boot recipient's proportionate stock inter-
est. 120 Moreover, at the heart of the Wright test is the suspect pro-
position that section 356(a) should be read in pari materia with
section 302, the redemption section.12 1 At best, the language and
purpose of the two sections are similar. Though many Code sec-
tions incorporate the rules of other Code sections by express refer-
ence, section 356(a)(2) does not refer to section 302(b) at all. In-
deed, Congress twice considered but failed to enact alternative
language for section 356(a)(2) that would have incorporated the
"not substantially disproportionate" test used in section
302(b)(2).12
119. See Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 289.
120. Suppose the familiar example in the text is slightly changed, so that Y Corp. paid
$350 to A instead of $250. Using the Wright test, if A had received Y Corp. common shares,
instead of the $350 boot he in fact received, A would have received 35 shares in Y Corp.
($350 boot received - $10 fair market value per Y Corp. share). A would have received,
actually and constructively, 70 shares of Y Corp. stock, thereby making him a 63.6% owner
(70 of the 110 issued and outstanding Y Corp. shares). The hypothetical redemption of the
35 constructively owned shares would have reduced A's percentage of stock ownership by
17%, from 63.6% to 46.6% (35 of the 75 issued and outstanding shares of Y Corp.). In the
original example in the text, the hypothetical redemption reduced A's interest by 13.4%,
from 60% to 46.6%. Because the extraction of earnings and profits is greater in the instant
example ($350 compared to $250), the hypothetical redemption reduces a greater percentage
of A's stock and, hence, is more likely to satisfy one of the section 302(b) tests.
121. See Wright, 482 F.2d at 605; see also Levin, Adess & McGaffey, supra note 36, at
289; Comment, supra note 18, at 838.
122. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 302, 306 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 51, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4682 (rejecting the House
proposal); STAFF REPORT OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 86TH CONG.,
SUMMARY OF THE SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS ON CORPORATE DIsTI-
BUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS 449, 451 (Comm. Print 1959); see also Golub, supra note 12, at
906; Samansky, supra note 43, at 11-12; Note, supra note 44, at 737 & n.211.
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More importantly, as discussed earlier, 123 the benchmark for
testing equivalency for redemptions is whether the redemption
causes a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate
interest in the corporation. This is an appropriate measure when
used within the framework of a single corporation, but this mea-
sure cannot be used for acquisitive reorganizations between two
distinct corporations with previously unrelated shareholders, be-
cause such reorganizations neither reduce nor preserve the share-
holders' proportionate interest in their corporation. Rather, the re-
organization changes the corporation in which the shareholders
own stock, making the shareholders' part in the transaction resem-
ble an exchange of their stock.
Proponents of the Wright test claim that a reorganization us-
ing boot resembles a reorganization coupled with a post-merger re-
demption. 12 4 But this resemblance weakly supports the Wright
test, because a reorganization using boot also resembles a reorgani-
zation coupled with a distribution and a reorganization coupled
with a pre-merger redemption. These transactions can result in tax
consequences often contradictory to those that result from the
Wright test.
Finally, advocates of the Wright test deprecate the artificial
bifurcation of the reorganization and the boot under the Shimberg
and pre-merger redemption tests.125 Yet, the Wright test also bi-
furcates the reorganization using boot into two transactions: the
reorganization itself and the hypothetical post-merger
redemption. 2 '
Like the Wright test, the Shimberg and hypothetical pre-
merger redemption tests stand on unsure footing. 2 7 As noted ear-
123. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
124. See, e.g., Note, Return to Bedford, supra note 107, at 1004.
125. Wright, 482 F.2d at 607.
126. Id.
127. The Shimberg and pre-merger redemption tests are sufficiently similar to be eval-
uated together. Given the tax treatment for pro rata redemptions and boot distributions,
the two tests frequently result in the same tax consequences. The Supreme Court in United
States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 312 (1970), declared that all pro rata redemptions must be
treated as distributions. Because the pre-merger redemption test treats the distribution of
boot like a redemption and because Davis treats pro rata redemptions like distributions, the
pre-merger redemption test would treat a pro rata distribution of boot as a distribution. See
also Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 290.
The hypothetical pre-merger redemption test and the Shimberg test might produce di-
vergent results for non-pro rats boot distributions. Presumably, a non-pro rata distribution
of boot might constitute a disproportionate redemption under the hypothetical pre-merger
redemption test, thereby allowing capital gain treatment for the boot recipient. On the other
hand, though the Shimberg court stated in dicta that a non pro rats distribution of boot
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lier, proponents argue that the congressional purpose for section
356(a)(2) was to eliminate differential treatment between nonreor-
ganization and reorganization situations; therefore, the boot should
be viewed as a substitute for a distribution by the transferor corpo-
ration prior to the reorganization.8 s If this is a correct interpreta-
tion of congressional intent, Congress acted mysteriously in using
the nebulous "dividend-effect" language instead of an explicit dec-
laration that the boot should be treated as a distribution by the
transferor corporation. Congress made such an explicit declaration
in sections 356(b) and 356(e).""
The framework of the acquired corporation is as artificial as
the Wright test's characterization of the reorganization as a re-
demption.180 The Shimberg and hypothetical pre-merger redemp-
tion tests ignore what the transaction really is, a reorganization,
and instead treat the distribution of boot like it is a transaction
standing alone, recharacterizing the distribution of the boot, which
is one of the reorganization's smallest components, into something
that it isn't-a distribution or a pre-merger redemption. These two
tests emphasize that the reorganization using boot is like a reor-
ganization coupled with the distribution, or a reorganization cou-
pled with a pre-merger redemption. It is, however, also like a reor-
ganization coupled with a post-merger redemption-a transaction
likely to result in contradictory tax consequences.
Furthermore, Shimberg offered the continuity of interest prin-
ciple as part of its test. The court opined that the distribution of
boot during a corporate reorganization is like the distribution of a
dividend without a corporate reorganization, because the reorgani-
zation is "merely 'a continuance of the proprietary interests in the
continuing enterprise under modified corporate form.' "181 The
continuity of interest principle underlies the basic statutory ap-
proach to reorganizations; nonrecognition of realized gain or loss
and deferral of realized gain or loss through the carryover basis
lacked the hallmark of dividend equivalence, see Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 290, a literal appli-
cation of Shimberg's pre-merger distribution test might produce a contrary result. Sections
301 and 316 denominate all distributions of property by a corporation to its shareholders as
dividend, regardless of the proportionality of the distribution, so long as the distribution is
covered by earnings and profits. See Gately & Pratt, supra note 107, at 54.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16; Golub, supra note 12, at 905-06;
Moore, supra note 51, at 129-33, 137-41; Note, supra note 45, at 297.
129. I.R.C. § 356(b), (e) (1976).
130. See Samansky, supra note 43, at 29-31.
131. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288.
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rules.1 32 Many reorganizations in fact are no more than a change in
form, and the shareholders indeed continue their proprietary inter-
est in virtually the same company (e.g., reincorporation in another
state)." s
Yet, acquisitive reorganizations are often much more. An
amalgamation between a small and a large corporation usually is
an absorption of the small corporation by the large corporation.
The shareholder in the small concern is likely to relinquish his sta-
tus as a proprietor and accept marketable securities and perhaps
some boot in exchange. Professors Bittker and Eustice offer a hy-
pothetical set of facts almost identical with the facts in Shimberg
to illustrate: "[T]he merger of an independent corner grocery store
into a national food chain [is a "reorganization"], although the lo-
cal merchant who has exchanged his stock for the marketable stock
of the surviving corporation may feel, quite rightly, that he has
'sold out.' "134
When the amalgamation involves distinct corporate entities of
relatively equal size and power, the reorganization effects a sub-
stantive change in the two entities rather than a metamorphosis of
each. The continuity of interest principle, thus, is often more
dogma than fact and is not a persuasive reason for accepting the
Shimberg test. Moreover, the acceptance of Shimberg's reliance on
the continuity of interest principle leads to discrediting the auto-
matic dividend rule. 3 5 If the constituent corporations are treated
like one big corporate enterprise modified only in form, then the
mere existence of accumulated earnings and profits turns the boot
distribution automatically into a dividend.
The Shimberg test leads to a further anomaly. If a shareholder
disposes of all of his stock for cash, he receives capital gain treat-
ment. If he disposes of all his stock for cash and stock, but not
enough stock to meet the continuity of interest requirement, he
receives capital gain treatment.136 The existence of earnings and
132. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 1 14.04.
133. Id.
134. Id. 14.01, at 14-5.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 186-91.
136. The continuity of interest doctrine does not derive from any particular language in
the reorganization sections, but is wholly a doctrine of judicial origin based on what is con-
ceived to be the unstated but fundamental statutory purpose of providing for nonrecogni-
tion of gain or loss only if the reorganization exchange is distinguishable from a sale. B.
BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 1 3.05.
Factors to be taken into consideration in determining continuity of interest include
"the nature of the consideration received in the transaction . . . . the remoteness of the
ownership interests from the underlying assets of the business, the proportion of old owners
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profits in his corporation is irrelevant in both of these situations. If
he disposes of all of his stock for cash and enough stock to meet
the continuity of interest requirement, however, the Shimberg test
results in treating the recognized gain as ordinary income (pro-
vided, of course, it is covered by accumulated earnings and
profits).
1 7
The emphasis the Shimberg court placed on the proportional-
ity of the boot distribution is questionable. The distribution was
not pro rata to all of the shareholders in the continuing enterprise;
it was pro rata only to the shareholders of the corporation that
ceased to exist.38 Moreover, the proceeds from the sale of a busi-
ness are likely to be distributed pro rata to the sellers. A pro rata
distribution of the proceeds is not at all inconsistent with the char-
acterization of the transaction as a sale. For example, under the
Zenz v. Quinlivan'89 rationale, a pro rata redemption coupled with
a sale of some or all of the remaining stock may entitle the re-
deemed shareholder to capital gain treatment. 40
The bastardized Wright test is perhaps appropriate for non-
divisive D, E, and F reorganizations (and even for amalgamating
reorganizations between affiliated corporations) because these
transactions resemble redemptions. The shareholders own stock in
the same corporation, or in affiliated corporations, before and after
the reorganization. They surrender some of their stock in exchange
for boot. Because these transactions take place within the frame-
work of a single corporation, it is possible to measure whether the
reorganization reduced the shareholders' proportionate interest in
the corporation-the benchmark for testing dividend equivalency.
On the other hand, the bastardized Wright test is completely
inappropriate for amalgamating reorganizations between previ-
ously unrelated corporations for the same reasons posited above
with respect to the Wright test. The single corporation framework
of the redemption test is ill-fitted for amalgamating reorganiza-
tions that neither reduce nor preserve the shareholders' propor-
tionate interest in their corporation. The amalgamating reorganiza-
tion provides the shareholder with a new interest in a new
corporation. Moreover, the bastardized Wright test is the most ar-
who continue their participation after the transaction, [and] the length of time the investor
interests continue." Id. 14.11, at 14-18.
137. Fassler, supra note 107, at 161.
138. Samansky, supra note 43, at 32-33.
139. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
140. Samansky, supra note 43, at 34 n.136.
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tificial of all the tests. At least the Wright, Shimberg, and pre-
merger redemption tests are correct that reorganizations using
boot resemble a reorganization coupled with, respectively, a post-
merger redemption, a pre-merger distribution and a pre-merger re-
demption. An acquisitive reorganization, however, is a mul-
ticorporate transaction involving several sets of shareholders. It is
unlike a redemption: a single corporate transaction involving one
set of shareholders. Furthermore, by casting the reorganization as
a redemption, the bastardized Wright test ignores completely the
essence of the reorganization-the fusion of previously distinct
corporations into one.
C. Evaluation of the Jurisprudential Quality of the Case Law
A basic constraint imposed on judges in our court system is
that the parties to the controversy formulate the issues for the
court. Judges rarely stray outside the parameters of the issues as
set by the parties. Often judges decide cases by selecting between
the arguments of one side or the other. Indeed, on appeal, the re-
viewing court will not hear arguments advanced by the parties un-
less previously advanced at trial.14 1 Similarly, judges are reluctant
to look beyond the briefs of counsel to resolve the tax law contro-
versy before them. As a result of this dependence, judges in section
356(a)(2) cases have followed counsels' lead and have tried to force
the redemption rules of section 302(b) on reorganizations involving
boot. Because these rules do not fit, and because courts have ac-
cepted the artificial rules previously discussed, section 356(a)(2) is
ambiguous and allows for no definitive explanation of its meaning.
The district court opinions in Shimberg14 2 and Sellers v.
United States,"4 both reversed by the Fifth Circuit, illustrate the
difficulty and deserve thorough review. The district court judge in
Shimberg is the author of the bastardized Wright test,14 4 which
another district court followed in Sellers. These two district courts
egregiously misconstrued Wright.1 4 5 As discussed above,146 to apply
141. For example, in Wright the circuit court refused to consider whether the attribu-
tion rules of section 318 applied because the issue was not raised at the trial level. Wright,
482 F.2d at 610; see id. at 612, 613 (dissent).
142. 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
143. 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1 78-5325 (N.D. Ala. 1977), rev'd, 615 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.
1980).
144. For a discussion of the bastardized Wright test, see supra notes 117-18 and accom-
panying text.
145. For commentary critical of the Shimberg district court opinion, see Golub supra
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the meaningful reduction test, Wright compared the percentage of
the acquiring corporation's stock actually received by the boot re-
cipient to the percentage of the acquiring corporation's stock he
would have received if the acquiring corporation had distributed
stock in place of boot.14 7 The Wright court, in effect, focused on
percentages of ownership in the acquiring company. Though trying
to apply Wright, the Shimberg and Sellers courts instead com-
pared the percentage of stock owned by the boot recipient in the
acquired corporation before the reorganization to the percentage of
stock owned by him in the acquiring corporation after the reorgan-
ization.1 8 Their analyses shifted from the acquiring corporation to
the before-and-after approach. Because in both cases the boot re-
cipients had been majority shareholders in closely held corpora-
tions and, as a result of the reorganization received a miniscule
percentage of stock in much larger corporations,4 9 the district
courts held that the reduction in the percentage of stock ownership
from a majority to less than one percent satisfied the meaningful
reduction test of section 302(b)(1) and, therefore, did not have the




Considering the tests they adopted for section 356(a)(2), the earth
might have shaken if they had not so held.
We can trace the jurisprudential error in Shimberg to the
court's reasoning in footnote five of the opinion. 5 ' There, the dis-
trict court accurately recounted the hypothetical post-redemption
test used in Wright. 1 2 For some unknown reason, however, the
note 12, at 911 (noting that the post-merger test applied by the district court was a misap-
plication of the Wright holding, but postulating that the rationale behind the Fifth Circuit's
reversal may presage a return to the automatic dividend rule); Hurley, supra note 45, at 335,
337 n.6 (noting that the district court in Shimberg simply misapplied the Wright analysis);
Samansky, supra note 43, at 23-27 (noting that the "before and after" test applied by the
district court in Shimberg would, in effect, legitimize bail-out of earnings and profits at
capital gains rates); Comment, supra note 18, at 842 (noting that the "meaningful reduction
of . . . interest" that formed the basis of the district court's decision was the relationship
between the percentage of stock of the target company owned before merger compared with
the percentage of stock of the acquiring corporation owned post-merger; the author hypoth-
esizes that the errors of both the district and appellate courts could have been avoided by
comparing the percentage of stock of the acquiring company that Shimberg would have
received had boot not been distributed to the percentage he actually received).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
147. 482 F.2d at 607.
148. Shimberg, 415 F. Supp. at 836; Sellers, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 78-6197.
149. Shimberg, 415 F. Supp. at 836; Sellers, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 78-6197.
150. Shimberg, 415 F. Supp. at 837; Sellers, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 78-6197.
151. 415 F. Supp. at 836 & n.5.
152. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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district court in Shimberg thought that Wright's discussion of the
constructive post-merger redemption was merely a part of Wright's
discussion of section 302(b)(2) unconnected with the rest of the
Wright opinion. The district court in Shimberg discarded as "du-
bious dictum" 153 Wright's discussion of section 302(b)(2), and,
most importantly, the constructive post-merger redemption along
with it. Footnote five was incorrect. After determining that section
302 principles could properly be applied to section 356(a)(2),
Wright devoted considerable analysis to the conclusion that it
should apply the meaningful reduction test to the surviving corpo-
ration.1" It explicitly rejected a contention that it should look at
the percentage of stock ownership in the acquired corporation.1" '
The opinion clearly did not limit the constructive post-merger re-
demption to section 302(b)(2).'"
The characterization of Wright's discussion of section
302(b)(2) as dictum by the district court in Shimberg underscores
its failure to understand corporate tax law. Perhaps the court
thought that only section 302(b)(1) should apply because, of the
three subsections in section 302(b), only section 302(b)(1) has lan-
guage resembling that of section 356(a)(2)." 7 Section 302(b)(1),
however, completely overlaps the other subsections of section
302(b), which provide safe harbors for transactions that would also
satisfy the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" language of
section 302(b)(1).' 5 Logically, assuming the redemption rules ap-
ply to section 356(a)(2), a court would first apply section 302(b)(2)
before resorting to section 302(b)(1). Section 302(b)(2) is a
mechanical test that gives a definitive answer; by contrast, section
302(b)(1) is a qualitative test that requires subjective evaluation.
153. Id.
154. See Wright, 482 F.2d at 606-10. The court agreed with the Commissioner's inter-
pretation "that § 356(a)(2) should be read in pari materia with § 302 for the purpose of
determining whether a distribution (has] the effect of a dividend." Id. at 605 (footnote omit-
ted). Its reasoning seems well supported by the authorities cited in the footnote. See id. at
605 n.11. Once the court seized this basic premise, it was then necessary to apply the section
302 tests to the redemption. The "dubious dictum" language of the district court in Shim-
berg is caused by that court's failure to understand that section 302 principles may properly
be applied to the section 356(a)(2) situation.
155. See id. at 607-08.
156. See id. at 608. (Because the Wright court analyzed the boot-in-connection-with-
reorganization transaction under section 302, it was forced to look at percentages of stock
owned before and after the redemption-necessarily an analysis of the surviving company).
157. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 51-66. (As noted there, because of piecemeal
drafting, it is not clear that Congress intended the provisions of section 302 to apply to the
section 356(a)(2) situation.)
158. Cf. supra note 73.
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The Wright court considered section 302(b)(2), but quickly recog-
nized that the taxpayer failed the fifty percent stock ownership re-
quirement. After dispensing with section 302(b)(2), the Wright
court proceeded to a section 302(b)(1) determination. 15 9
The Sellers district court relied completely on the Shimberg
district court opinion. It excised a part of the Shimberg district
court opinion, plugged in different names and numbers to fit its
own fact pattern and adopted the bastardized Wright test as it had
been devised by the Shimberg district court.160 Although Wright
was the seminal case for the line of authority the Shimberg district
court purported to follow, Sellers contained no evaluation or dis-
cussion of the Wright test. The Sellers court was oblivious to the
misconstruction of Wright by the Shimberg district court and
thereby unwittingly perpetuated the interpretative error. The Sell-
ers district court judge apparently did not even read the important
cases on the issues before him.
Despite their misconstructions of Wright, the district court
opinions in Shimberg and Sellers display an attractive spark of
layman's perceptiveness. The Shimberg district court opinion
stated:
Prior to the merger in this case, Plaintiff was the president,
chief executive officer and owner (directly or indirectly) of ap-
proximately 66% of the stock of LSC. As a result, under Florida
law he could effectively control the corporation. Subsequent to
the merger the Plaintiff owned (directly and indirectly) less than
1% of the outstanding common stock of MGIC, a large publicly-
held corporation whose stock was traded on the New York Stock
Exchange and was held by approximately 5,200 shareholders.
His former rights to direct the affairs of LSC were extinguished.
His interest in MGIC afforded him no control whatsoever over
the destiny of the large national corporation. No longer was he
the major "owner" of a successful local company operating in
several Florida counties. He was then the holder of a miniscule
159. 482 F.2d at 608. The taxpayer in Shimberg argued in the district court that the
scope of inquiry "should be restricted to a post-merger comparison between what the tax-
payer's interest in the resulting consolidated corporation would have been with and without
the boot payment," i.e., the Wright test. The Shimberg district court retorted, "Wright does
not support such a myopic view of the consequences of the transaction in determining Sec-
tion 302(b)(1) 'dividend equivalence' in resolving the parallel issues presented under Section
356(a)(2)." Shimberg, 415 F. Supp. at 837 n.6.
160. Compare Sellers, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 78-6197 ("[blased upon the Supreme
Court decision of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bedford's Estate") with Shimberg,
415 F. Supp. 832, 835-37 ("[b]ased upon the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Bedford's Estate").
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percentage of the outstanding stock of a huge, publicly-held cor-
poration. It is clear that the merger resulted in a radical change
and meaningful reduction in the nature of the Plaintiff's interest
in the continuing business. The net effect of the transaction was
a sale by the Plaintiff and the other LSC stockholders of their
LSC stock to MGIC for cash and marketable securities in a pub-
licly owned corporation."'
The district court judge in Shimberg was perceptive. He
viewed the transaction as a whole and characterized it for what it
really was-a sale by the shareholder of the closely held corpora-
tion. Unfortunately, he cluttered his opinion with a discussion of
the redemption rules of section 302(b). 12 He should not have at-
tempted to force the facts to fit under section 302. Rather than
using the unnecessary "meaningful reduction" language, he should
have used the "radical change" in the "nature" of the share-
holder's interest1" as the keystone of his analysis. When the share-
holder's interest has changed so much, he should not be deemed to
have received a dividend: a dividend is a distribution by a corpora-
tion with earnings and profits without a substantial change in the
shareholder's interest in the corporation.1 6 4 In reversing, the Fifth
Circuit in Shimberg observed that the bastardized Wright test
used by the district court renders section 356(a)(2) "virtually
meaningless when a large corporation swallows a small one in a
reorganization, for there will always be a marked decrease in con-
trol by the small corporation's shareholders, unless the same share-
holders control both corporations."1" 5 This observation is cor-
rect. 66 But when a publicly held corporation acquires the closely
held corporation, have not the shareholders in the closely held cor-
poration "sold out"?' 67 Certainly laymen connected with either of
the corporations would believe that the shareholder had sold his
closely held concern for widely held stock and cash. They would
view the characterization of boot as a dividend to be a feat of
161. 415 F. Supp. at 836-37 (footnote omitted).
162. Id. at 835-36.
163. Id.
164. Bittker and Eustice note that the continuity of interest doctrine operates "more as
a blunt instrument than as a scalpel" in reorganizations. B. BrrrKEn & J. EUSTCE, supra
note 5, 1 14.11, at 14-29. See also, Gately & Pratt, supra note 107, passim; Golub, supra
note 12, passim; Hurley, supra note 45; Peterson, Determining Dividend Equivalence of
Boot Received in a Corporate Reorganization, 32 TAx LAw. 834 (1979).
165. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288.
166. Fassler, supra note 107, at 161; Comment, supra note 18, at 844; see supra notes
133-34 and accompanying text.




The sale analysis has adherents. For example, one commenta-
tor, eschewing section 302 principles, contends that dividend treat-
ment should never be applied in true acquisitive reorganizations
because "in all instances" the boot recipient sells a part of his
stock for the boot he receives.' This commentator bases his argu-
ment partly on "economic reality"' 19 and partly on legislative his-
tory.17 0 Although his remarks reflect keen analysis, his position has
weaknesses and is especially lacking in statutory support. Though
an early congressional report"' used a nonacquisitive reorganiza-
tion with an obvious tax avoidance purpose as an example to jus-
tify the enactment of the earliest version of section 356(a)(2), sec-
tion 356(a)(2) does not distinguish between acquisitive and
nonacquisitive reorganizations. It applies literally to both. Further-
more, it is not limited to controlling tax avoidance schemes.1 72 This
analysis also fails to counter the contrary inferences in the legisla-
tive history that the purpose of the statute is to equalize the treat-
ment of distributions in reorganizations with distributions outside
of reorganizations.'
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Shimberg17 4 is partly insightful.
Shimberg correctly observed that a reorganization between two
corporations with common ownership may be the functional
equivalent of a redemption in a single corporation. In that circum-
stance a court correctly might apply the meaningful reduction test
of section 302(b)(1)17 5 by comparing the percentage of stock owner-
ship of the boot recipient after the reorganization to his percentage
of stock ownership in the corporation before the reorganization. If
the reorganization resulted in a meaningful reduction, capital gain
treatment of the distribution would be appropriate. Shimberg
noted further that the transaction before the court was a reorgani-
zation between two different corporations of different sizes and
with different shareholders. 76 Unlike the district courts in Shim-
168. Golub, supra note 12, at 912.
169. Id. at 913.
170. Id. at 912.
171. See supra text accompanying note 85.
172. Certain Code sections and tax doctrines have been specifically developed to con-
trol tax avoidance schemes, e.g., the doctrines of assignment of income, substance over form,
business purpose, step transactions, accounting methods, and allocation to properly reflect
income. I.R.C. §§ 357(b), 368, 446(b), 482 (1976).
173. See supra text accompanying note 83.
174. 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
175. Id. at 287.
176. Id.
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berg and Sellers, the appellate court in Shimberg properly distin-
guished the "fundamental differences"' 177 between bona fide ac-
quisitive reorganizations involving unrelated corporations and
readjustments among related corporations that might amount, as a
practical matter, to a redemption. Because the transaction in
Shimberg was not a readjustment among commonly controlled cor-
porations, and more closely resembled a reorganization than a re-
demption, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply the redemption
rules. 1
78
Despite these virtues, Shimberg is partly sophistic. Shimberg
accurately recounted the section 356(a)(2) tests as applied by the
Wright circuit court 7 9 and by the Shimberg district court1 80 (the
Wright test and the bastardized Wright test, respectively). Yet
Shimberg failed to notice, or at least failed to discuss, that the
Shimberg district court misapplied the Wright test. The Wright
test does not liken a reorganization using boot to a redemption, as
does the bastardized Wright test. Instead, it treats the transaction
as a post-reorganization redemption, a transaction far different
from a redemption standing alone. This misperception vitally un-
dermines much of Shimberg's reasoning for rejecting the "mean-
ingful reduction" analysis of Wright. Shimberg criticized Wright
on the theory that the Wright test would always result in a "mean-
ingful reduction" and hence a capital gain under section 302(b) be-
cause "a majority shareholder in a small corporation will always
become a minority shareholder in a large corporation that acquires
a small one."1'' This criticism is apt for the bastardized Wright
test that compares the interest in the acquiring corporation to the
interest in the acquired corporation. The court completely missed
the point of the Wright test, which measures holdings in the ac-
quiring corporation only. In Wright, the boot recipient's holdings
in the acquired corporation and his status as a majority share-
holder in it are irrelevant.
Shimberg also relied heavily on the resemblance between a re-
organization using boot and a reorganization coupled with a pre-
merger distribution:'8 2 If the Shimberg court had analyzed Wright
correctly, it would have noticed that the reorganization using boot
177. Id. at 290.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 287.
180. Id. at 286.




also resembles a reorganization coupled with a post-merger re-
demption, a transaction likely to result in tax consequences contra-
dictory to the pre-merger distribution. Shimberg, however, did not
analyze Wright, but rather reviewed the district court's misappli-
cation of Wright. The court, therefore, rejected the Wright test be-
cause of the results it would have obtained upon its misapplication
by the district court.
Furthermore, Shimberg manipulated the legislative history of
section 356(a)(2). That history is rife with conflicting inferences,
some of which may support Shimberg's basic proposition that the
boot should be treated as a pre-reorganization distribution. Never-
theless, it is beyond the pale to say, as does Shimberg, that "the
legislative history of § 356(a)(2)'s predecessor . . . makes clear that
a distribution that would have been a dividend if made prior to the
reorganization is subject to the same treatment when made as part
of the transaction.' 183 The example in the legislative history184 in-
volves a distribution of boot as part of the merger of a corporation
with earnings and profits into a newly created corporate shell
owned by the same shareholders in the same proportion-an obvi-
ous tax avoidance scheme. The example in the legislative history
was "a transaction very different from" the bona fide acquisitive
reorganization of Shimberg.185 It is this troubling comment in
Shimberg that smacks of sophistry. It does not seem possible that
federal court judges so misunderstand corporate tax law that they
fail to discern differences between bona fide acquisitive reorganiza-
tions and the shell game portrayed in the legislative history.
Further, though the court disavowed it, Shimberg may signal a
return to the automatic dividend rule.'86 The court expressed its
belief that a non-pro rata distribution of boot would not be treated
as a dividend under section 356(a)(2). It also left open the possibil-
ity that it might apply section 302 principles in reorganizations in-
volving corporations with common shareholders.1 87 Yet, the Shim-
berg test treats the gain recognized on the account of boot as a
"distribution" by the acquired corporation.' 88 If the boot is
deemed a pre-merger distribution, it is also a dividend unless there
183. Id. at 288 (citations omitted).
184. See supra text accompanying note 85.
185. Samansky, supra note 43, at 33.
186. At least some commentators assert that Shimberg constitutes a return to the auto-
matic dividend rule. See Fassler, supra note 107, at 161; Golub, supra note 12, at 911.
187. 577 F.2d at 290.
188. Id. at 288-89.
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are no earnings and profits. The theory that the Fifth Circuit has
returned to the automatic dividend rule is buttressed by its opin-
ion in General Housewares Corp. v. United States.189 General
Housewares interpreted Shimberg as follows:
In Shimberg v. United States ... we held that Wright's
"meaningful reduction" test should not apply where, as here, the
"boot" paid would have been taxed as a dividend if made prior
to the reorganization. Since at the time of this distribution [the
acquired company's] accumulated earnings and profits exceeded
the cash distributed to [the acquired company's] stockholders,
under Shimberg the cash "boot" so distributed to them had "the
effect of the distribution of a dividend," section 356(a)(2) (see
also section 316(a)), and was thus includable in gross income,
section 301(c).190
The Shimberg court also rejected the taxpayer's argument
that its analysis abrogates the "step transaction" doctrine. 191 Tech-
nically, Shimberg is correct. Reorganizations using boot are not
multistep transactions. They are unitary transactions with the boot
representing part of the consideration transferred to one group of
shareholders. Shimberg does violate, however, the spirit of the step
transaction doctrine, which requires that we should analyze the en-
tire transaction as a whole and not in fragments. There may be
cogent reasons for adopting a rule that approximates the automatic
dividend rule or that analyzes reorganizations in fragments. In-
stead of disavowing its actions like they were unclean, however, the
Fifth Circuit should have affirmatively stated its reasons for adopt-
ing the rule.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Wright is more difficult to
evaluate. It begins well. by noting that the determination of
whether boot has the effect of a dividend under section 356(a)(2) is
"not without difficulty since the distribution has some but not all
the characteristics of either a sale or a dividend."'192 It then states
that section 356(a)(2) should be read in pari materia with section
302.'9' Considering the transactions involved in Wright, this read-
ing of the Code was eminently sensible. The transaction was a con-
solidation of two affiliated corporations. The majority shareholder
agreed to accept boot in exchange for a reduction in the percentage
189. 615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).
190. Id. at 1066 (citation omitted).
191. 577 F.2d at 289-90.
192. Wright, 482 F.2d at 604.
193. Id. at 605.
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of stock ownership in the consolidated corporation that he other-
wise would have received. Much like a disproportionate redemp-
tion, the consolidation rearranged the proportionate interests of
the shareholders. Hence, the use of the redemption tests made
sense. Wright, however, did not thoroughly analyze the redemption
test in this situation. It should have emphasized that the affiliation
between the corporations made the redemption tests appropriate.
And it should have expressly reserved its opinion about the appro-
priate test for reorganizations involving unaffiliated corporations.
It did neither. Instead, the Wright court supported its position by
merely citing several cases and secondary authorities.19
Wright's reasoning is analytically sound for rejecting the Com-
missioner's argument for a pre-merger redemption test. When a
transaction rearranges stock interests in multiple corporations and
combines them into a new single corporation, the redemption anal-
ysis should not isolate just one of the constituent corporations.'19
Wright further stated that redemption tests, based as they are on
a reduction of interest, "make sense only in relation to a corpora-
tion that will continue to exist." 96 Finally, Wright noted that it
makes no sense to measure hypothetically what the reduction in
interest would have been in one of the dissolved corporations when
what is "significant" is the "change in ownership" in the consoli-
dated corporation.191
The bastardized Wright test would have been inappropriate in
the Wright case. Though the constituent corporations to the con-
solidation were affiliated, they were not owned in the same propor-
tions by the shareholders. The largest minority shareholder in the
consolidated corporation did not own any stock in one of the con-
stituent corporations. The boot recipient owned different propor-
tions in the constituents."' If the boot recipient had owned the
same proportion in both constituents, the bastardized Wright test
might have been appropriate. Because the boot recipient did not, a
comparison between his stock interest in the constituents and his
stock interest in the consolidated corporation would not have been
helpful. To illustrate, in Wright the boot recipient owned approxi-
mately ninety-nine percent of one constituent and fifty-six percent
194. Id. at 605 n.11.
195. Id. at 607.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 608.
198. Id. at 607.
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of the other."' 9 The consolidation left him with approximately
sixty-two percent ownership in the consolidated corporation,00
which was less than his interest in one constituent but more than
his interest in the other.
Wright is an adequate case. Its hypothetical post-merger re-
demption test is well suited to its unique fact pattern, the dispro-
portionate distribution of boot in a consolidation of affiliated cor-
porations. Shimberg even concedes this point.20 1 In fact, Shimberg
and Wright are not necessarily inconsistent. 02 A court could
choose the Wright test in cases matching the Wright fact pattern
and the Shimberg test for pro rata distributions. Wright would
have been much better if the court had explained why it was ap-
plying redemption principles. Because it did not, it is not great
jurisprudence.
V. THE EXECUTIVE (THE "GOVERNMENT")
20 8
When the Government acts as tax collector, it is never popu-
lar. Yet commentators 204 and even courts20 5 have launched more
than the usual number of attacks at the Government for its han-
dling of section 356(a)(2). Does it deserve them?
The nebulosity of section 356(a)(2) necessarily generates dif-
fering interpretations of its meaning. Some of the criticisms di-
rected at the Government may reflect no more than the critic's dis-
agreement with the Government's interpretation-an
interpretation usually no better and no worse than the critic's. We
have already reviewed the varying interpretations, i.e., the tests the
courts have used, and shall not repeat that review. Instead, the
199. Id. at 602.
200. Id. at 607.
201. 577 F.2d at 287.
202. See Comment, supra note 18, at 844.
203. The United States Government disperses responsibility for tax litigation and
statements of position on tax issues among different offices. The Department of Justice rep-
resents the United States in the district courts and the Court of Claims, and represents the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in appeals from the Tax Court. Additionally,
it handles all other appellate work. The Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service
represents the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in the Tax Court. The Chief
Counsel is answerable to the General Counsel for the Treasury Department, who has general
oversight of litigation in the Tax Court. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
is responsible for issuing revenue rulings and revenue procedures. For convenience, the term
"Government" will be used rather than referring to the particular office handling the litiga-
tion or issuing the revenue ruling or procedure.
204. Golub, supra note 12, at 910.




Government's performance as an administrator will be examined.
Commentators waged a sustained battle against the Govern-
ment's dogged adherence to the automatic dividend rule. Because
the Government conceded the issue in 1974,206 we need not resur-
vey the battleground, except to suggest that the Government re-
acted more out of adversarial zeal than ministerial disinterest.
While its steadfastness should be admired, its protracted advocacy
of an unreasonable position impeded a reasonable evaluation of al-
ternative readings of section 356(a)(2). Instead of trying to resolve
the meaning of section 356(a)(2), commentators and courts ex-
pended most of their intellectual energy attacking the automatic
dividend rule.
20 7
Current critics especially complain that the Government is in-
consistent in its treatment of section 356(a)(2), applying the step
transaction doctrine for most transactions, especially when it helps
collect more taxes, but rejecting it for reorganizations using boot
because fragmenting the reorganization into components (i.e.,
treating the boot like a pre-organization distribution or redemp-
tion) results in dividend treatment instead of capital gain. Critics
claim that Revenue Ruling 75-83,"' which promulgates the pre-
merger redemption test, is inconsistent with Revenue Rulings 55-
745,209 75-447210 and 75-360.211 Revenue Rulings 55-745 and 75-447
both concern situations resembling the fact pattern of Zenz v.
Quinlivan,1 2 an integrated transaction wherein a sale and a re-
demption are coupled to terminate or reduce a particular share-
holder's interest in the corporation. Acknowledging the correctness
of the rationale of Zenz, the revenue rulings opine that the trans-
206. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121.
207. Samansky, supra note 43, at 16; see Gerson, supra note 19, at 847-52; Moore,
supra note 51, at 141-44; Shoulson, supra note 19, at 573-77.
208. 1975-1 C.B. 112 (when a sole shareholder of acorporation owns 100% of the stock
both before and after a hypothetical pre-merger redemption, his percentage ownership has
not been diluted; therefore, the redemption is "essentially equivalent to a dividend").
209. 1955-2 C.B. 223 (facts and circumstances are similar to Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d
914 (6th Cir. 1954), hereinafter discussed).
210. 1975-2 C.B. 113 (involving situations in which athird shareholder is brought into a
two-shareholder corporation with an equal stock interest by coordinated sales and
redemptions)...
211. 1975-2 C.B. 110. Golub supports this view. See Golub, supra note 12, at 910 (pur-
pose of which was to explain the position of the IRS regarding McDonald v. Commissioner,
52 T.C. 82 (1969), hereinafter discussed).
212. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) (involving a sole shareholder of a corporation selling
part of her stock to a competitor and shortly thereafter redeeming the remainder of her
stock for an amount of cash and property approximately equal to the corporation's earned
surplus).
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action should be "viewed as a whole, ' 21 3 "effect [should] be given
only to the overall result,"2" " and the "fragmenting of the whole
transaction into its component parts" is "proscribe[d]." 21 Revenue
Ruling 75-360 acknowledges that the Government had incorrectly
treated a redemption and a reorganization as separate transactions
in McDonald v. Commissioner,"6 a 1969 Tax Court case, and that
the Tax Court correctly had found a single integrated transac-
tion.2 7 In a similar vein, Revenue Procedure 77-37 states that sales
and redemptions of stock occurring prior to or subsequent to a re-
organization, which are part of the plan of the reorganization, will
be considered in the fifty percent continuity test.2 1 8 In summary,
the critics complain that it is "clearly unreasonable and arbitrary"
for the Government to fragment the distribution of the boot for
reorganizations, as it does in Revenue Ruling 75-83 and in Shim-
berg, but to step together the redemption and reorganization in
Revenue Ruling 75-360, the redemption and sale in Revenue Rul-
ing 75-447, and various other transactions throughout all areas of
tax law.2 9
These criticisms are perhaps persuasive reasons for rejecting
the Government's position that reorganizations using boot should
be the one transaction that is fragmented in our tax analysis. Yet,
the Government's positions are not necessarily inconsistent. The
Government believes that the purpose of section 356(a)(2) is to
equalize the tax consequences of distributions within and without
corporate reorganizations. If the statute requires nonreorganization
distributions and reorganization distributions (distributions of
boot) to be treated equally, then both the pre-merger redemption
test of Revenue Ruling 75-83 and the pre-merger distribution test
of Shimberg make sense. According to this view of the legislative
intent, Congress was concerned with the extraction of earnings and
profits; like redemptions and nonreorganization distributions, the
distribution of boot is an extraction. The Government can argue
213. Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. at 114; see also Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. at 224
(acknowledging that Zenz is correct under 1954 Code).
214. Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. at 114.
215. Id.
216. 52 T.C. 82 (1969) (pursuant to a plan of reorganization, 100% of the acquired
corporation's preferred stock was redeemed for cash and its common stock was exchanged
for the acquiring corporation's common stock).
217. Rev. Rul. 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110.
218. 1977-2 C.B. 568, § 3.02.
219. See Golub, supra note 12, at 910; Levin, Adess & McGaffey, supra note 36, at 291-
92; Comment, supra note 51, at 635.
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that its fragmentation of reorganizations using boot is mandated
by the statute, which requires the Government to view the boot as
an extraction of earnings and profits apart from the reorganization.
The Government, however, has acted inconsistently in other
instances. Prior to 1974, its official position was the automatic divi-
dend rule. It even urged the rule on the district court in Wright.
220
Yet, it sometimes departed from this position when it was to its
advantage. For example, in Idaho Power Co. v. United States
221
the Government temporarily abandoned the automatic dividend
rule in favor of a section 302(b)222 analysis. There, the taxpayer
was the corporation distributing the boot, and it wanted the boot
to be deemed a dividend so that it would be entitled to the tax
credit granted to public utility corporations by section 26(h) of the
1939 Code.22  Again, in King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States22 4
the Government conveniently discarded the automatic dividend
rule when it wanted to deny the boot recipient, a corporation, the
eighty-five percent dividend deduction of section 243.225 The ulte-
rior motive for this change in position seems obvious: The Govern-
ment wanted to collect more taxes.
2 26
Furthermore, the Government apparently posited a slightly
different test in Shimberg than it did in Revenue Ruling 75-83. At
least Shimberg, a Government victory, used a pre-merger distribu-
tion test rather than the pre-merger redemption test of Revenue
Ruling 75-83.27 As discussed above, both tests treat pro rata dis-
tributions of boot as distributions, but the two tests might lead to
220. 482 F.2d at 604.
221. 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
222. The applicable provision under the 1939 Code is § 15(g).
223. 161 F. Supp. at 808.
224. 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
225. Id. For reference to the inconsistency in Idaho Power, see Samansky, supra note
43, at 15 n.58.
226. Courts are not always obtuse to the relative position of the private sector and the
Government in tax cases. The Third Circuit recently noted that taxpayers like to character-
ize a transaction as a reorganization when there is no boot, because they can postpone pay-
ment of tax. When there is boot, however, they might prefer to denominate the transaction
as a liquidation, thereby receiving capital gain treatment and avoiding dividend treatment
under section 356(a)(2). Inferring that the Government takes positions based more on the
amount of revenue that it can collect than on matters of tax administration, the Third Cir-
cuit concluded: "The subjective motivation of neither the taxpayer nor the Commissioner is
relevant." Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860, 867 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 836 (1980); see also Wright, 482 F.2d at 604 n.7 (noting that it was to the Commis-
sioner's advantage to argue against the application of the automatic dividend rule); Saman-
sky, supra note 43, at 15 n.58 (similar observation).
227. For an explanation of these tests, see supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
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different results for non-pro rata distributions of boot.228 The vari-
ation in stances most likely is the result of the lack of coordination
between the Justice Department and Counsel for the Commis-
sioner 229-hardly a legitimate justification for this inconsistency.
The Government's greatest transgression has been in its fail-
ure to act as a leader in resolving the uncertainty and conflict en-
veloping the tax treatment of boot. Undoubtedly, it had a hand in
the 1954-1959 proposals to eliminate the dividend-effect language
from section 356(a)(2).230 Beyond that, it has done little. It let the
revenue ruling espousing the automatic dividend rule stand from
1956 through 1974, 23 despite overwhelmingly critical commen-
tary2 2 and adverse judicial reaction. 233 It discarded the automatic
dividend rule temporarily when convenient for maximizing its rev-
enues. Currently, it apparently has advanced a pre-merger redemp-
tion test and a pre-merger distribution test, two similar but
slightly different tests. It has not let us know which it prefers or
even if it believes they would produce different results. Revenue
Ruling 75-83 offers citations in lieu of any cogent analysis for its
pre-merger stances. The Revenue Ruling also offers support from
the legislative history of section 356(a)(2), but, as discussed above,
the legislative history supports conflicting inferences.3 4
The Government should take some initiative in resolving sec-
tion 356(a)(2)'s conflict. First, the Government should settle on
one approach for bona fide acquisitive reorganizations. Should the
principles of section 302(b) apply? Should the boot be treated as a
pre-merger distribution? Should there be a different test for ac-
quisitive reorganizations involving corporations with a commonal-
ity of shareholders? Second, it should not alter the stance just to
maximize the amount of revenue it can collect. Third, it should
offer cogent analysis in support of the tests it espouses. Fourth, it
should seek legislative rewriting of section 356(a)(2) to eliminate
its obfuscatory language.
228. See supra note 133.
229. See supra note 203.
230. For a discussion of these proposals, see supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
231. Rev. Rul. 56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191; Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-
516, 1974-2 C.B. 121; see Golub, supra note 12, at 910.
232. See authorities cited supra note 103.
233. See cases cited supra note 104.




Obviously, Congress must redraft section 356(a)(2). Section
356(a)(2) is basically an anti-bailout section. Bailout opportunities
in reorganizations exist mainly in two situations: when there is an
amalgamation of two or more corporations with a commonality of
shareholders, and when the same group of shareholders who owned
the corporation before the reorganization owns the corporation af-
ter the reorganization (e.g., a nondivisive D reorganization). Con-
gress might properly exclude bona fide acquisitive reorganizations
between corporations with unrelated shareholders from section
356(a)(2)'s coverage, because the boot recipient in fact has sold his
stock for new stock and boot. In this situation, his recognized gain
should be capital gain. Section 356(a)(2) might qualify this exclu-
sion with an exception for transactions in which the distribution of
boot is motivated by a tax avoidance purpose or at least is not
supported by a business purpose. This exception would eliminate
the back-scratching potential of a merger between two companies
that both have earnings and profits. For nondivisive D, E, and F
reorganizations and acquisitive reorganizations between corpora-
tions whose stock is owned by identical shareholders in identical
proportions, section 356(a)(2) might provide for a "before and after
test" with mechanical standards like section 302(b)(2). These
transactions are rearrangements of the shareholders' interest
within the context of a single corporate framework, much like a
redemption. Acquisitive reorganizations between corporations that
share a commonality of shareholders but whose shareholders own
stock in different proportions resist easy analysis.235 Perhaps a hy-
pothetical post-merger redemption test with mechanical standards
like section 302(b)(2) would work. Most, importantly, Congress
should make section 356(a)(2) explicit. Indeed, even the automatic
dividend rule might be preferable to the current confusion over
section 356(a)(2). Although it is hard to see why we should treat as
a dividend the boot received by a shareholder in a small, local con-
cern gobbled up by a public corporation, at least the shareholder in
the small concern would know what to expect when he agreed to
take the boot.
None of the three branches of government has effectively dealt
with section 356(a)(2) and its predecessors. The statutory language
not only is the product of drafting errors,
2 36 but is also unclear2 37
235. Such was the situation involved in Wright. See 482 F.2d at 602.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
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and ill-fitting for many reorganizations.2 3 8 We should not be too
severe, for when Congress first enacted the provision in 1924,
United States income tax law was in its infancy. Moreover, corpo-
rate reorganizations are complex. Congress has had numerous op-
portunities since 1924, however, to amend the offensive dividend-
effect language and has failed to do so. The problems with section
356(a)(2) add cumulatively to the other uncertainties in corporate
tax law, inherently an abstruse area anyway.
The courts at least should receive some sympathy. They have
encountered difficulties in applying section 356(a)(2) because the
section is so ambiguous and ill-fitting. Still, we should not blithely
disregard the misconstruction of precedent by the district courts in
Shimberg and Sellers.289 Nor should we countenance the flagrant
misuse of an example in the legislative history by the Fifth Circuit
in Shimberg2 40 Should we remove tax cases from the federal dis-
trict and circuit courts? Some of the opinions construing section
356(a)(2) do evidence an ineptness for corporate tax issues.
Unlike Congress and some of the courts the Government has
not demonstrated an inability to understand the problems of sec-
tion 356(a)(2); but it has not shown much leadership in resolving
the issues. It has acted too much as an advocate and too little as an
administrator. Furthermore, it has not offered a complete analysis
to support its interpretation of section 356(a)(2), as it should.
237. Id.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 145-60.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
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